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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to discuss the history of civil rights and executive
order legislation with regard to public sector employment.

The research questions

addressed included: "When does an employer have the right to practice affirmative action
in awarding preferential treatment in hiring and promotions?"; "Are prospective
employers being discriminatory if they reqmre prospective employees to take an
examination,

even

though

there

is

evidence

that

minorities

usually

score

disproportionately lower than their white colleagues?"; and "Are termination policies
based upon seniority acceptable, if the majority of the senior employees are non minority
males?"
The major legal themes of sixteen federal cases were identified regarding public
sector affirmative action policy development.

Criteria necessary for analyzing the

constitutionality of affirmative action policies with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964 was formulated for
applicability within state, local, and federal agencies.
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non-minority males? The answers to these questions m addition to other insight 1s
provided throughout this report.

Organization of Study

The study is divided into primary and secondary sections.

The first chapter

discusses the organization and research design of the study. The second chapter analyzes
affirmative action programs from an historical perspective.

It traces the Progressive

movement of the mid 60s during the enactment of key civil rights legislation to the recent
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The third chapter discusses the two major
themes common throughout sixteen federal cases with regard to the implementation and
validity of affirmative action programs in public sector employment. The third chapter
also summarizes the findings of the sixteen federal cases with regard to answering the
questions concerning the issue of when does an employer have the right to legally
practice affirmative action in awarding preferential treatment in making employment
considerations regarding hiring and promotions?; are prospective employers being
discriminatory if they require prospective employees to take an examination, even though
there is evidence to support the fact that minorities usually score disproportionately lower
than their white colleagues?; and are termination policies based upon seniority
acceptable, if the predominant majority of the senior employees are non-minority males?
The third chapter also summarizes the findings of the sixteen federal cases with regard to
allegations of Equal Protection and Title VII violations. The fourth chapter discusses the
conclusion and findings of the study.

3

Research Design

The study was conducted by utilizing both primary and secondary sources. The
primary sources used were actual case statutes. The secondary sources used were law
journals, publications, and computer databases. Initially, the search began by accessing
the legal Lexis/Nexis database to acquire information regarding locating court cases
pertaining to affirmative action. After finding the court citations, the cases were used to
gain insight into locating constitutional issues that were common throughout the cases.
Upon gaining this information, the United States Code Annotated was consulted to find
the actual language of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Next, the Loyola University Information Service (LUIS)
database was accessed to gain additional information regarding locating legal journals
and periodicals specifically related to affirmative action in public sector employment.
The LUIS database provided a menu that supplied pertinent information and access
capabilities to the Loyola Law (LLAW) database, which indices the legal periodicals
covering criminal justice, law, and public policy issues. The 4 General Index (INDY)
database, which provides an index to major scholarly business, humanities, social
sciences, and science journals. Finally, the ProQuest Periodical Abstracts - Research I
database was used to access other scholarly journals related to the issue of affirmative
action. All of this information was combined and incorporated to provide the substance
and factual basis of this report.
The sources were used to answer pertinent questions regarding legally
sanctioned preferential treatment and racial classification used m employment

4

considerations, under the auspices of an employer's affirmative action plan. The research
questions addressed included: when does an employer have the right to practice
affirmative action in awarding preferential treatment when making employment
considerations regarding in hiring and promotions?; are prospective employers being
discriminatory if they require prospective employees to take an examination, even though
there is evidence to support the fact that minorities usually score disproportionately lower
than their white colleagues?; and are termination policies based upon seniority
acceptable, ifthe predominant majority of the senior employees are non-minority males?
The two major legal themes of sixteen federal court cases were identified and
discussed regarding public sector affirmative action policy development.

Criteria

necessary for analyzing the constitutionality of affirmative action policies with respect to
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Title VII Civil Rights Act of
1964 was formulated for applicability within state, local, and federal agencies. All of the
source material was incorporated into this report to provide substantial insight into
tracing the history and application of affirmative action programs in public sector
employment.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
1.

Affirmative Action refers to specific steps, beyond terminating

discriminatory practices, that are taken to promote equal opportunity and ensuring that
discrimination does not reoccur in the workplace. 1

1

Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and
Ethics," The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991, 11.

5

2.

Affirmative Action Employer refers to an employer that gives

preferential treatment to members of a protected class of individuals, 1.e. women,
minorities, veterans, and disabled persons. 2
3.

Affirmative Action in Employment includes hiring and promoting

protected class members on the basis of a formal affirmative action plan.

The

affirmative action plan is based upon proposed timetables and goals that have been
established via aid of a utilization analysis of an organization's work force. 3
4.

Affirmative Action Goals refers to the elimination of non legal barriers

in order to grant equal employment opportunities, including intentional discriminatory
practices and non intentional, structural or systemic discrimination.
5.

Discrimination

4

refers to an illegal or impermissible employment

decision, practice or policy that takes into consideration one of the statutorily prohibited
factors, e.g., race or gender under Title VII or age under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), or discrimination not considered job related and resulting in a
disparate impact on members of a protected class. 5

2

Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and
Ethics," 23.
3

Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and
Ethics," 24.
4

Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and
Ethics,'' 11.
5

John A Gray, "Preferential Affirmative Action in Employment,'' Labor Law
Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, January 1992, 25.

6

6.

Equal Employment Opportunity refers to the legal obligations of

statutorily mandated employers not to "discriminate" against members of a protected
c l ass. 6
7.

Equal Opportunity Principle refers to all people being given the right to

equal access to whatever goods and services are needed to develop their natural talents,
so that persons with equal natural talents have equal opportunities and resources to
develop their talents and become competitive in a market economy. 7
8.

Ethical Distinction refers to the differentiation made between an

organization's obligation to comply with established conduct standards and the aspiration
to meet the goals of affirmative action plans. 8
9.

Ethical Question refers to the likelihood of particular legislation that

was unethical, however legal, prior to the enactment of Civil Rights Act of 1964. This
includes any legislation that denies opportunities to anyone solely based upon that
person's racial persuasion. On the other side, the ethical question asks on what grounds is
it ethical to deny employment to a qualified individual by granting employment or
promotions on a competitive basis, simply because there is under representation by
members of a protected class of individuals in a particular area or organization?

9

6

John A. Gray, "Preferential Affirmative Action in Employment," Labor Law
Journal, 25.
7

Rayrnond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and
Ethics," 11.
8

Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and
Ethics," 25

7

10.

Mandatory Affirmative Action refers to affirmative action required by

federal and state laws. 10
11.

Mandatory Affirmative Action Requirement requires that an employer

implement an affirmative action plan and make a good faith effort of implementation. 11
12.

Merit Principal refers to the preferential jobs and rewards that should

be distributed on a meritorial basis in a social context characterized by equality of
.

opportumty.
13.

12

Minority Business Enterprises refers to the inclusion of any business in

the country which is owned and employed by at least 51 % of a minority group
representation that includes African Americans, Eskimos, Spanish-speaking, Indian,
Oriental, or Aleut Citizens. 13
14.

Preferential Affirmative Action refers to any type of preferential

treatment, albeit informal or formal, where an employment opportunity is given solely
based upon a person's race, gender, veteran status, or disability. For example, choosing

9

Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and
Ethics," 24.
10

Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and
Ethics," 24.
11

Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and
Ethics," 25.
12

Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and

Ethics," 7.
13

City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) at 469.
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one applicant over another because the selected candidate is a minority, Vietnam veteran,
female, or handicapped. 14
15.

Pure Equality of Opportunity refers to the equal legal access combined

with an uncompromising adherence to the idea that the best qualified individual should
always be hired by employers. 15
16.

Remedial Affirmative Action refers to an employers efforts to assure

equality of access to all employment opportunities for all qualified individuals,
particularly the protected classes of people who have been traditionally overlooked or
denied access to employment activities. This action is achieved by targeting recruiting
activities or providing remedial training programs to minorities and other members of the
protected classes. 16
17.

Reverse Discrimination refers to affirmative action that unfairly

discriminates against a non-minority group by going beyond the limits prescribed by
1aw.

17

18.

Set Asides refers to programs in which a certain percentage of

governmental contracts are awarded to women and minority owned businesses. 18

14

Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and
Ethics," 23.
15

Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and
Ethics," 11.
16

Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and
Ethics," 23.
17

Raymond Bron Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and
Ethics," 24.

9

19.

Target Groups refers to classifications of people that are identified as

having been negatively affected by discrimination, and therefore targeted for concern by
affirmative action programs.

This group includes any discrimination practices based

upon race, color, sex, religion, and alienage. 19
20.

Utilization Analysis contrasts the racial and gender composition of an

organization's work force, at all levels, with that of the qualified labor pool reasonably
available to fill those positions. For example, if the percentage of minorities and women
in the employer's work force is lower than that in the available labor pool, then there is a
work force imbalance. 20
21.

Voluntary Affirmative Action refers to action plans that are voluntarily

designed by individual organizations and meet federal and/or state regulations. 21
The following chapter discusses the history of legislation and executive orders
leading to affirmative action policies and programs. The third chapter provides an
analysis of major themes of supreme court affirmative action legislation. The fourth
chapter is the concluding chapter and discusses the findings of the study.

18

David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman &
Society, Vol. 5, No. 198, April 15, 1994, 22.
19

David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman &
Society, 12.
20

David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman &
Society, 24.
21

David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman &
Society, 24.

CHAPTER2
HISTORY OF LEGISLATION AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS LEADING
TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS

Civil Rights Act of 1866

The Civil Rights Act of 1866 deals specifically with contracts. 1 The Act states:
All persons ... shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ...
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white persons. 2
The Act was proceeded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which
was ratified in 1868. Section 1 of the act guarantees to all citizens, "equal protection
under the law, due process of all laws, and the right to life, liberty, and property. " 3

1

Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981-82 (1970).

2

Bron Raymond Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and

Ethics," The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991, 19.
3

Bron Raymond Taylor, "Affirmative Action at Work, Law, Politics, and

Ethics," 19

10

11

Executive Order 10,925

Executive Order 10,925 was issued on June 9, 1961 in response to the final
report of the Committee on Government Contracts to President Eisenhower, which was
chaired by then Vice President Nixon. The report concluded that:
(1) Overt discrimination in the sense that an employer actually refuses to

hire solely because of race, religion, color or national origin is not as prevalent as is
generally believed. To a greater degree, the indifference of employers to
establishing a positive policy of non-discrimination hinders qualified applicants
and employers from being hired and promoted on the basis of equality.
The direct result of such indifference is that schools, training institutions,
recruitment and referral sources follow the pattern set by industry. Employment
sources do not normally supply job applicants regardless of race, color, religion, or
national origin unless asked to do so by employers. Schools and other training
sources frequently cannot fill non-discriminatory job orders from employers
because training may take from one to six years or more .
... (2) There is no justification for discrimination in employment because of
race, color, religion, or national origin in work performed by contractors paid by
federal funds .... 1
The implications of the report regarding affirmative action seem to suggest that
the patterns of historical racism and/or sexism prevalent in Corporate American
institutions were advised to become less overt with absence of malice. Nixon's report
emphasized that "indifference is hardly responsive to prohibitions that speak to
intentional, malicious, misconduct."

2

The executive order also gave the President's

1

James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action," University of Davis Law
Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, Winter 1988, 395.
2

James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action," University of Davis Law
Review, 396.

12

Committee authority to adopt rules and regulations and issue orders deemed appropriate
and necessary to achieve the purposes of the order.
Origina11y, the program focused on the complaint process and voluntary
accommodations. Executive Order 10,925 spawned the Plans for Progress Program. The
Plans for Progress Program was enacted in response to the NAACP's announcement of its
intentions to file a complaint against a federal contract granted to the Lockheed
Corporation, which at the time was the second largest U.S. defense contractor.

In order

to avert the negative publicity, Lockheed in conjunction with the government agreed to
make sweeping reforms and to act as the prototype for voluntary affirmative action plans.
In response to the threat and possible enforcement of the suit, other companies consulted
with committee representatives to develop voluntary affirmative action programs. The
plans were far reaching in scope, committing the companies to anti discrimination
practices in all aspects of human resources and development. Companies were required
to confirm their intentions to take positive action to recruit and maintain minority
employment, with special emphasis on training, educational development, and
promotions. Companies were required to make pledges regarding the development of
equal opportunity policies and recruitment sources, create detailed plans on the
implementation of the proposals, and produce progress reports regularly to the President's
Committee. The Plans for Progress Program was responsible for increasing minority
representation in the total work force from 5. 1% to 5. 7%. The total African American

13

representation doubled. However, the representation was less than 1% among all of the
companies participating in the program. 3
Executive Order 10,925 required certain contractors to take "affirmative action"
procedures to ensure that people did not suffer discrimination due to their race, creed,
color, or national origin. Initially, this executive order pertained strictly to recruiting,
initiating practices to eliminate prejudicial attitudes, and eliminating practices that could
pose as barriers to the fair treatment of protected class members. 4 This was in contrast to
previous efforts to ensure the enactment of civil rights measures. Prior to the enactment
of this order, protective measures prohibited certain conduct based on a perceived
undesirable status such as race, religion, sex, or national origin. This order stipulated
that recipients of federal government contracts be required to eliminate past vestiges of
racial discrimination by taking steps towards implementing affirmative action programs
and prohibiting any form of discrimination based upon a person's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 5

3

James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action," University of Davis Law
Review, 396-97.
4

Robert K. Robinson, John Seydel, and Hugh J. Sloan, "Reverse Discrimination
Employment Litigation: Defining the Limits of Preferential Promotion," Labor Law
Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3, March 1995, 132.
5

Leslie A. Nay and James E. Jones, Jr., "Equal Employment and Affirmative
Action in Local Governments: A Profile," Law and Inequality, A Journal of Theory and
Practice, The University of Minnesota Law School, Vol. VIII, No. 1, November 1989,
104.

14

Civil Rights Act of 1964

President Lyndon Johnson said, "You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by
saying: Now you are free to do as you desire ... you do not take a person who, for years
has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a race and
then say, you are free to compete with all of the others."

6

This speech was given in 1965

by President Johnson at Howard University, a prestigious African American college. It is
thought that this speech fueled the fire and initiated the fervor associated with affirmative
action and civil rights legislation. Civil rights legislation provided the incentive to enact
affirmative action programs designed to eliminate the vestiges of past racial
discrimination practices imposed upon African Americans initially, and then
incorporated to include all minorities and women.
During the 1960s, President Johnson's Civil Rights Act of 1964 legally
prohibited racial discrimination in public education and employment.

In 1965, the

Voting Rights Act ended years of depriving Southern African Americans from exercising
their right to vote in public elections. The Federal Housing Act of 1968 ensured that all
people received public access and accommodation regardless of race or ethnicity.
Theoretically, all of these advances towards eliminating past vestiges of racial/ethnic and
gender discrimination practices with regard to voting, public accommodation access,
public education and employment were eliminated with the passages of the above

6

David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman &
Society, Vol. 5, No. 198, April 15, 1994, 22.

15

mentioned acts. However, in reality this was not the case in everyday situations. African
Americans were still located in the bottom rung of socioeconomic standings. During this
time of legislative enactment, they trailed non-minorities in the areas that could make a
difference

socio-economically,

such

as

employment

opportunities,

educational

attainment, increased income, and increases in life expectancy rates. John F. Kennedy
once said, "There is little value in a Negro's obtaining the right to be admitted to hotels
and restaurants if he has no cash in his pockets and no job. "7 The frustration of the
African American was evidenced in the riots held in 100 major cities, such as Los
Angeles, New York, and Chicago.

The frustration spilled over in the way of fire

bombings and labor strikes, which didn't end until an accord was reached with regard to
the adoption of improved economic conditions and benefits for minorities. Affirmative
action programs were adopted to diffuse the frustration and to combat the lingering
impact of legally sanctioned racist practices. 8
Executive Order 11,246

Executive Order 11246, which was signed in 1965 helped to strengthen the
enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Order required that federal contractors
"take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed and that employees are

7

David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman &
Society, 22.
8

David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman &
Society, 22.
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treated during employment without regard to their race, color, sex, or national origin. "9
This is an effective tool for federal agencies, because if there is suspicion of
discrimination practices operating within a company or educational facility, the agency is
authorized to withdraw federal funding in the form of contracts.
The Act delegated full authority to the Secretary of Labor. The responsibilities
included administering provisions relating to nondiscrimination in employment practices
by government contractors and subcontractors.

The Office of Federal Contract

Compliance (OFCC) was established by the Secretary of Labor during this time to ensure
implementation of the program goals. The spirit ofvoluntarianism changed to mandatory
enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation and policies.

The government began

enforcing affirmative action development programs. The Plans for Progress Program
merged with the National Alliance of Business program. The goal being to provide large
numbers of full time employment positions for disadvantaged persons. 10
The executive order stipulates that organizations granted federal contracts of
$10,000 or more, are prohibited from discriminating against individuals in employment
based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Contractors are required to take
"affirmative action" to ensure equal employment of all applicants and that employment

9

David Edmonds, "Race Against Positive Discrimination," New Statesman &
Society, 22.
10

James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action,'' University of Davis
Law Review, 398.

17

considerations are made without regard to an applicant's race, sex, religion, color, or
·
}
· · 11
nat1ona
ongm.

Companies that are recipients of federal contracts m excess of $50,000 are
required to develop affirmative action plans which establish objectives and timetables for
instituting increased minority and female representation to eliminate racial and/or gender
imbalances in a manner reflective of the current local labor market.

12

Title VII
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, preferential gender and/or racial
based treatment and racial and/or gender quotas are banned. Quotas are only required in
instances where the courts have adjudged an organization guilty of perpetuating past
discrimination practices. 13
§703 (a)(l) of Title VII provides protection from employers who fail or refuse to
employ, discharge, or discriminate against individuals with regard to compensation,
terms, conditions, or employment consideration on the basis of the individual's race,
color, sex, national origin, or religion. 14

11

Harry E. Groves and Albert Broderick, "Affirmative Action Goals Under Title
VII: Statute, Legislative History, and Policy," Thurgood Marshall Law Review, Vol. 11,
No. 2, Spring 1986, 29.
12

Harry E. Groves and Albert Broderick, "Affirmative Action Goals Under Title
VII: Statute, Legislative History, and Policy," Thurgood Marshall Law Review, 29.
13

Harry E. Groves and Albert Broderick, "Affirmative Action Goals Under Title
VII: Statute, Legislative History, and Policy," Thurgood Marshall Law Review, 29.
14

Theresa Johnson, "The Legal Use of Racial Quotas and Gender Preferences By
Public and Private Employers," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 40, No. 7, July 1989, 420.

18

§703 (a)(2) of Title VII provides protection against employers who limit,
classify, or segregate applicants or employee's in manners which would deprive or tend to
deprive an individual of employment consideration or negatively impact the individual's
employment status because of the individual's race, color, national origin, sex, or
. . 15
re 11g10n.

Revisions were made in 1972 to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Most
notably was the extension of Title VII's coverage applicability to state, local, and federal
government. 16 In addition, an amendment to Title VII's remedial section was made,
which included two additional clauses made to the statute. The revision reads: "such
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to ...
reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay... or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate."

17

It has been found that the Supreme Court has

not categorically denied nor affirmed a response to the question concerning whether §706
(g) grants license to affirmative action goal relief 18
Title VII established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
The EEOC is a quasi-legislative, administrative, judicial body that does not have the
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authority to enforce its legislation and/or statutes. The Commissioners are authorized to
conduct investigations and to advocate conciliation if there is probable cause to do so.
Enforcement is carried out by plaintiffs or an attorney general, and occasionally by the
United States Department of Justice when patterns or practice cases are involved. Title
VII legal enforcement is provided in the federal district court system, however they have
limited judicial review of final agency actions. Federal courts have expansive powers to
issue orders after establishing the presence of illegal employment practices. §706 (g) of
Title VII provides the court with the authority to "enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate." §706 (h) prohibits the limitations imposed by the Norris-La Guardia Act on
federal courts sitting in equity from being read into Title VIL
The pattern or practice provision, §707 granted the Attorney General authority
to bring action "requesting such relief, including an application for a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order or other order against the person or persons
responsible for such pattern or practice, as he/she deems necessary to ensure the full
enjoyment of the rights herein described." 19
§708(g) of Title VII grants the court authority to enjoin the respondent from
engaging in any unlawful practices and orders appropriate affirmative action remedies,
but isn't restricted to reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without restitution, or
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any other appropriate equitable relief if found that the employer engaged or intentionally
engaged in unlawful employment practices. 20
Federal and state agencies have separate affirmative action objectives and
requirements. The EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) is a federal
agency that was established to monitor and enforce compliance with the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. The authority of the EEOC was enhanced in the 1972 Equal Employment
Opportunity Act.

This act broadened the powers of the commission to include

monitoring of all companies with more than 15 employees. Initially, the threat of being
charged with an EEOC infraction prompted a great number of companies to enact
voluntary affirmative action programs. However, a EEOC suit can drag on within the
federal court system for a number of years. They are also very difficult to prove, with the
burden of proof being placed on the plaintiff.

During the Reagan and Bush

administrations 1980-1992, it was an unwritten rule that prosecution of civil rights
discrimination suits were not significant, and received low priority ranking among more
significant cases. This effectively opened the gates to corporate racial/ethnic and gender
discrimination, without threat of recrimination. 21
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The Philadelphia Plan

During 1967-68, the Department of Labor developed the Philadelphia Plan in
response to the OFCC's concern and growing frustration in its attempts to devise a
method of promoting minority representation within the construction industry.
However, it was found that the plan violated competitive bidding principles by requesting
that the affirmative action requirements be determined after the contractors had let their
bids. The Philadelphia Plan was revised and reissued during the Nixon administration.
The goal of the plan was to stimulate the construction industry. However, the most
famous aspect of the plan was that it provided the fundamental basis for establishing
standards for affirmative action programs which are applicable to non construction
employers.

The Philadelphia Plan addressed three specific needs. First, there was a

problem of labor unions excluding minorities from entrance into local unionization.
Second, there was the problem of the refusal of labor unions to replace lost workers due
to the creation of new jobs and attrition with workers trained under the auspices of the
union apprenticeship programs.

Third, the problem encountered when Philadelphia

contractors refused to employ qualified minorities for available construction positions.

22

Proponents of the Philadelphia Plan could not ignore the fact that even if the
plan's goals were fully achieved, the representation of minorities on a construction
project would have been lower than the total percentage of African American
construction workers available in the labor market. The only requirement that the federal
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government stipulated was that the construction organization make a "good faith effort to
achieve the goals." The plan prohibited employers from engaging in overt discriminatory
practices.

However, the plan did not establish a quota system to ensure parity in

employment. The plan did not require employers to employ unqualified minorities or to
discriminate against non-minorities in order to satisfy the requirements of the plan. The
penalty for an employer who failed to meet the prescribed goals and timetables warranted
an investigation into the manner in which the employer established the plan to achieve its
goals. In order to establish presumptive compliance under the terms of the Philadelphia
Plan, an employer is required to meet the goals and timetables established under the
executive order.

Provided that the employer did not have any formal accusations of

discrimination lodged against the company, the government deems that the employer has
satisfied all components in its obligation as a federal contractor. 23
The Philadelphia Plan has been challenged in federal courts on the grounds of
Title VII violation, violating the National Labor Relations Act, exceeding the scope of
the Secretary of Labor's authority under the Philadelphia Plan, exceeding Presidential
authority under the U.S. Constitution, and as a violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments under the constitution. However, the Third Circuit court rejected all of the
arguments presented against the Philadelphia Plan and established judicial authority
legalizing the President's Executive Order Program.

23
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the use of goals and timetables in establishing affirmative action programs to eliminate
past vestiges of racism. 24
Civil Rights Act of 1991

In 1989, the court decided in Patterson v McLean Credit Union to significantly
narrow the scope of the application of the 1866 Act. 25 The decision contributed to the
widely held belief among civil rights lobbyist that the court was reversing the advances of
civil rights legislation.

The decision of this case contributed to the urgency of the

insistence of the Civil Right' s lobbyist to enact new legislation strengthening anti
discrimination legislation in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Act was
designed to ensure a broader interpretation of the 1866 Act and to be more inclusive than
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 26
Specifically, the Act protects non-minorities in reverse discrimination actions.
It mandates that all potentially affected parties are required to be afforded the opportunity

of participation in the consent decree process. Title VII legislation prohibits employers
from classifying employees in a manner which "would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee because of such individual's race. "27 However, employers are not prohibited
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from designing affirmative action plans that advance the purpose of Title VII intentions
of breaking down racial barriers that promote segregation or eliminate employment
discrimination. 28
Race-conscious affirmative action plans, especially those initiated by the federal
government are required to be subjected to a higher degree of scrutiny by the court
system. This is done in order to ensure that "those employees not benefiting from the
plan" do not have their individual interests infringed upon unduly by their employers. 29
Civil Rights Issues Challenging Public Sector Employment
Interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been cumbersome and tenuous
at best. The Supreme Court has had the arduous task of making the final decision as to
the application of the law to various cases. Some of the questions that they are faced
with concern the question of whether an employer is being discriminatory if it requires its
prospective employees to take an examination, given the fact that African Americans fail
the test in disproportionately greater numbers than non-minorities? Another question that
they are faced with, concerns whether a firing policy based on seniority is acceptable if,
due to past vestiges of racial and gender discrimination practices, the majority of the
older employees are white? There is also the ethical question as to whether a racially
imbalanced work force is prima facie 30 evidence of blatant discrimination? 31
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Thirty years after the implementation of the first programs, affirmative action
programs are being implemented in almost every segment of American society. This
issue has become one of the most divisive and polarizing issues in American politics. The
very notion of affirmative action and minority set aside programs have become a
prominent part of the America work ethic. Affirmative action programs and other equal
opportunity programs have been responsible for the integration of minorities and women
with respect to educational and socio-economic strides that have helped to place these
traditionally disadvantaged groups into the American mainstream. 32
There was an innate problem associated with affirmative action. It was never
clearly defined and was ambiguous in terms. It was initially intended to pacify African
Americans, but was enlarged in scope to include all minorities, women, and the
disadvantaged.

Affirmative action protection encompasses almost every facet

imaginable with regard to ensuring equal opportunity access. It includes employment,
higher education, and set aside programs. Critics have deemed that affirmative action is
"reverse discrimination" and just as prolific as discrimination because minorities receive
favorable consideration on the basis of their race, irrespective of merit. However their
adversaries contend that affirmative action programs serve to balance economic and
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educational distribution opportunities by providing incentive and training programs to
traditionally disadvantaged members of American society. 33
Polls consistently confirm the fact that non-minorities are anti-affirmative action
proponents. More than 70% of whites believe that non-minorities are being deprived of
employment opportunities because of racial quotas and set aside programs. The general
consensus among non-minorities is the belief that a potential employer would employ a
minority to fill a position based upon a racial quota mandated by either a affirmative
action or voluntary affirmative action program. Conversely, an overwhelming majority of
non-minorities support open housing programs in which minorities are given the
opportunity to live in areas that they select to live. They also support the concept of
integrated schools and facilities. However if the question posed mentions affirmative
action programs and possible negative effects on non-minorities, then the support for
education and employment opportunities becomes negative. This general attitude has far
reaching implications on political agendas and platforms. Affirmative action has failed to
attract popular support within the American mainstream. There is also a growing number
of African American intelligentsia who question the wisdom of race targeted policies that
are the bread and butter substinence of affirmative action programs. There is a growing
sentiment that affirmative action programs have not aided minorities. Instead, it is felt
that they have contributed to the break down within the African American families value
system and strong work ethic.
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One of the most outspoken advocates of decreased affirmative action programs
is William Julius Wilson, of the University of Chicago. He advocates the imposition of
race neutral measures to improve the plight of the poor. 34 This is viewed to be
contradictory

among

non-minorities

because

affirmative

action

programs

disproportionately benefit African Americans and are viewed as being politically correct
to the majority population. Glenn Loury of Boston University is another African
American anti-affirmative action advocate. He supports the contention that affirmative
action programs significantly diminish African Americans from gaining the incentive to
acquire educational and vocational skills, which would enable them to become more
productive members of society. 35 Stephen Carter of Yale advocates the Pure Equality of
Opportunity Principle. This is the perception among whites that a African American
employee is the best possible candidate, rather than merely because of his race. 36 Another
minority anti-affirmative action advocate, Shelby Steele believes that the race neutral
policies narrows African American objectives. He believes that racial preferences emit
the negative message that African Americans are more proud of their past suffering than
in their present achievements. 37
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Studies have shown that African Americans are three times more likely than
whites to live below the poverty level. The unemployment rate for African Americans is
twice that of the rate for whites. On average, African American men earn approximately
73% of a white males salary. African Americans also are placed at a disadvantage
educationally. Even though graduation rates have increased since the 1970's, African
American college enrollment has declined. African American faculty representation is
approximately 3% of total academic staff in American colleges and universities. Overall,
African Americans represent 12% of the total American population. 38
The African American middle class population has profited from affirmative
action programs. It has been found that 30% of the African American population consist
of middle class African Americans. It has been reasoned that the increase in African
American middle class representation can be attributed to significant inroads in
education as a result of affirmative action policies and programs. This is in stark contrast
to the fact that there has been virtually no measurable upward mobility among African
Americans since 1975. This fact has fueled the debate that the only beneficiaries of the
affirmative action programs have been African American middle class participants, not
the disadvantaged African Americans, which were the original target group. On the other
side, it is also argued that all African Americans suffer some aspect of racial
discrimination, not just the economically or educationally disadvantaged. 39
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The ongoing battle between the winners and losers in the affirmative action war
is far from over.

There have been tradeoffs due to the gains of affirmative action

policies. There have been increases in minority and/or female representation in white
and blue collar positions. The tradeoff has occurred among those minorities or females
who have steady employment and those who are habitually unemployed. This is both
true for African Americans who have college degrees and those without. 40
Since the middle 1960's, there has been a significant increase in the number of
African Americans employed in the public sector or in organizations with ties to the
public sector.

Conversely, there has been a significant decrease in minority

representation among private sector employment. The reason for this shift is obvious.
Federal contractors are experiencing strong pressure to increase the amount of their
organization's minority and female representation in order to receive federal contracts
and meet federal compliance guidelines. Private sector organizations are discouraged
from recruiting minorities and females because of the growing belief that they are not
cost effective. It is believed that minorities and females require extensive training and
special treatment.

The extensive training is due to under education.

The special

treatment is due to the possible threat of litigation due to Title VII or constitutional
violations lodged by individual treated unfairly. 41 The consequence of the public sector
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embracement of minorities and females, is that government policy tends to have twice
the impact on African Americans than it has on white employees. 42
Preferential Treatment Issues Affecting Public Sector Employment

The answer to the question with regard to when an employer has the right to
practice affirmative action in awarding preferential treatment in hiring and promotions
has never been fully answered by the federal court system. It is an accepted rule of
thumb to assume that an employer is required to practice affirmative action measures
whenever the organization is a government contractor/subcontractor or whenever the
court has ordered the organization to implement an affirmative action plan due to
evidence of past discrimination practices currently impacting minorities. 43
Provided that the organization seeks a governmental contract, it must satisfy the
provisions set forth under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. The federal government requires contractors and
subcontractors receiving government contracts to be affirmative action contractors. In
effect, this requires contractors/subcontractors receiving contracts worth $10,000 or more
to establish proof that they are affirmative action contractors. If the contract is estimated
to be worth $50,000 or more, the contractor/subcontractor must submit a copy of their
written affirmative action plan to the federal government.

In order for the
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contractor/subcontractor to receive the award of a contract worth in excess of $1 million,
the affirmative action plan must be approved by the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP). The OFCCP requires that in addition to the contracting
unit, the entire business organization is required to practice affirmative action policy.
The OFCCP also requires that the contractor/subcontractor must not have any
implemented quota system or set aside programs. However, the contractor/subcontractor
must have established timetables and goals for the total implementation of the
affirmative action plan.
The OFCCP is a public enforcement agency, which is also a division of the
Department of Labor.

Executive Order 11,246 (race and gender); Vocational

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (physical and mental disabilities); and the Vietnam Era
Veterans Readjustment Act of 1974 (Vietnam veterans) are the legal basis for requiring
government contractors/subcontractors to have

representational

parity in their

employment force. 44
In 1989, the OFCCP reported that there were approximately 24 million
employees working under the federal auspices of private contractors/subcontractors.
However, the total work force at that time was 120 million.
approximated

because

it

does

not

reflect

the

number

These figures are
of employees

of

contractors/subcontractors employed at the state and local levels. It does not include the
total number of employees employed by organizations stipulated by federal court order or
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consent decrees to increase minority and/or gender representation within their
compames. Only federal courts are authorized to impose rigid quotas and timetables on
.

.

orgamzations.

45

All public and private sector employers covered by Title VII are required to be
in full compliance with Title VII limitations. This includes organizations who have self
imposed voluntary affirmative action programs, as well as those employers required to do
so under mandatory affirmative action programs imposed by the federal courts.
In Weber v. USW & Kaiser Aluminum, 46 the case centers around the fact that
the defendant, USW & Kaiser Aluminum adopted a voluntary affirmative action program
as a condition of a collective bargaining agreement made between the union and
management. The voluntary affirmative action plan established the goal of providing
training opportunities to African Americans, regardless of the fact that they had less
seniority than non-minorities. The plan also called for the organization to reserve 50
positions for African American employment. 47
The Supreme Court held that the voluntary plan did not violate Title VII's
prohibition against "discrimination on the basis of race." This was a landmark decision
because USW & Kaiser Aluminum had no record of having any past discriminatory
practices with regard to hiring and promoting African Americans. Even though the Court
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did not mandate the voluntary affirmative action plan, the Court found that the employer
"may lawfully discrimination on the basis of race without violating Title VII, so long as
the employer's plan is within certain limits." The Court required that voluntary plans
must have a remedial purpose, that it doesn't impact non-minority employment
opportunities, and doesn't unnecessarily trammel the rights of non-minorities.

This

decision as well as the Johnson decision extended the protections and requirements to
promotions and gender discrimination issues. There are four conditions that make or
preclude a legally valid affirmative action plan:
( 1) The plan must have a remedial purpose, designed to eradicate a
statistically significant imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.
(2) The plan must be temporary in duration, implemented in a manner that
is done to attain, but not maintain parity within the work force.
(3) The plan must not impede on non-minority and male employment
opportunities.
(4) The plan does not unnecessarily trammel the rights of others or
necessitate the replacement of employees currently in place. 48
Public sector employers must follow the guidelines set forth under Title VII, as
well as the guidelines of the Equal Protection Clause, as defined under Wygant and
Johnson as discussed later.
The Supreme Court held that government classification based on race are
subject to the strictest scrutiny and must satisfy both of the requirements as set forth
under the Strict Scrutiny Two Prong Standard.

48
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government must establish ... that there is an imbalance by companng the racial
composition of its work force with that of the reasonably available qualified labor pool;
that the government's own past discriminatory practices created the imbalance; and that
the plan is necessary to remedy the imbalance. "49 These requirements were established
under the terms of the Wygant decision. This decision has come to be associated with
the requirement that state and local governments are allowed to establish voluntary
affirmative action plan within their jurisdiction, provided that the plan is designed
specifically to remedy the present effects of the government's participation m
contributing to the perpetuation of past discriminatory employment practices.
Under Croson legislation, state and local governments are prohibited from
imposing minority set aside requirements on their contractors/subcontractors, except in
instances in which the government is attempting to remedy "the present effects of either
government's own identifiable past discriminatory practices" of contacting firms in the
local industry.
Constitutional limits established under Wygant and Croson

( 1) State and local governments affirmative action plans that utilize racial
classifications for employment purposes are subject to strict scrutiny.
(2) State and local governments may not itself be a voluntary affirmative
action employer, except in instances to remedy its own identifiable past
discriminatory practices.
(3)

49
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(4) State and local government MBE set asides are not allowed, except to
remedy either government's own past discriminatory practices or those of the local
industry, and then no more than necessary to remedy the identified
discrimination. 50
Interestingly enough, no court case has addressed the constitutionality of
governmental requirements that stipulate that contractors be affirmative action
employers.

The Equal Protection Clause of the constitution allows local and state

governments to require affirmative action employment practices of their own contractors
only to serve a compelling governmental interest of remedying past vestiges of racial and
gender discrimination.
Reverse discrimination suits question the methods used to create gender/racial
parity among organizations with or without established affirmative action plans. They
can be initiated either when an employer has an affirmative action plan in place, or
whenever the employer does not have an established affirmative action plan. Provided
that there is an established affirmative action plan, the employer is admitting in effect
that racial or other criterion are acting as a determinant in making employment decisions.
The employer defends his/her method of making employment decisions by alleging that
the employment consideration was made pursuant to the voluntary affirmative action
plan. The plaintiff has the arduous task of providing the burden of proof to establish the
invalidity of the affirmative action plan. The plaintiff has the option of using one or more
of the four Title VII limitations to support his/her contention. Provided that a public
sector employer or independent contractor is party to the case, a defense is required to be
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made under the constitutional limits established under either the Wygant or Croson
cases. 51
If the employer does not have a formally established affirmative action plan, the

Court has the option of requiring a modification to the McDonnell Douglass and Burdine
prima facie requirement. For example, the Court may require the plaintiff to introduce
evidence that supports the contention that race was a determining factor beyond the fact
that a minority was employed for a position that a non-minority applied. 52
The next chapter is the third chapter, which provides an analysis of the major
themes common in supreme court affirmative action legislation.
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Table 1 --- Differences between EEOC and Mandatory Affirmative Action

Employee Coverage

Factor Included

EEOC
All employees with an
number
established
of
employees
Includes more prohibited
factors, such as age and
religion.

Mandatory
Contractors
subcontractors

and

Includes
preferential
treatment for minorities,
women, handicapped, and
veterans.
Executive Order 11,246,
Vocational Rehabilitation
Act, and Vietnam Veterans
Act.
Requires an employer to use
"its best good faith efforts"
to achieve representational
parity.

Legal Basis

Title VII, Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADEA),
etc.

Basis Legal Obligation

Prohibits discrimination on
the basis of any one of the
stated factors, and allows
discrimination subject to
certain conditions on the
basis of race and gender.
The EEOC and OFCCP There is no private cause of
issues a "right to sue" letter action, except to challenge
under EEOC laws.
the constitutionality of the
action.

Enforcement Mechanism

Source: Preferential Affimiali vc Action in Employment. 11
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR THEMES OF SUPREME COURT AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION LEGISLATION

This study has analyzed the decision of sixteen federal court cases.

The

conclusion found that the decision of the cases were primarily based upon the decision
reached in City of Richmond v J.A. Croson 1 in 1989 with regard to equal protection
clause challenges, and Johnson v Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County2 in 1987
with regard to Title VII challenges. This study includes eight affirmative action cases
alleging violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment; six
affirmative action cases alleging violation of Title VII; and two cases that allege that an
affirmative action plan was in violation of both the equal protection clause and Title VII.

Equal Protection Clause
The Fourteenth amendment Equal Protection Clause stipulates that States are
prohibited from enforcing or creating legislation which denies an individual's rights as
afforded by the U.S. Constitution. Analysis of a claim of an equal protection violation is
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compared with the conditions set forth in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 3 These are
known as the "Two Prong Strict Scrutiny" analysis. Under this standard, the preference
given to minorities in affirmative action court decisions must be justified by a compe1ling
governmental interest that is achieved only through narrowly tailored means.

Court

sanctioned preferential employment consideration must serve a compelling governmental
interest of remedying past vestiges of racial and/or gender discrimination. The following
eight cases concern the issue of Equal Protection Clause, Fourteenth amendment to the
U.S. Constitution violations.

Richmond v J.A. Croson
The most significant aspect of this case is the Supreme Court determination that
the strict scrutiny standard is applicable to any affirmative action plan that is based upon
racial classifications. The strict scrutiny two prong test requires that racial classifications
are only necessary in instances that are justified by a compelling governmental interest,
and that the means used to achieve these goals are narrowly tailored to affect the
compelling governmental interest. 4
The Croson case centers around one principle of law: the constitutionality of the
City's minority set aside program.

3

Specifically, the challenge addresses the issue of
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whether the set aside pro!:,Tfam was in violation of the Fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. The City of Richmond required that prime contractors awarded City
construction contracts, subcontract at least 30% of the value of each contract to one or
more Minority Business Enterprises. The plan was designed to be remedial in nature,
however it was adopted after a public hearing concluded that there was no direct
evidence of either past racial discriminatory practices regarding the letting of business
contracts or evidence that prime contractors had discriminated against minority
subcontractors. The adoption was based upon the allegation that there was wide spread
racism occurring within the construction industry, and that less than 1% of total City
contracts had been awarded to minority contractors within the last four years. 5
In order to determine the constitutionality of the affirmative action plan, the
Court analyzed the necessity of the set aside remedial measure. It was found that even
though the general African American population of the City was 50%, only .67% of the
prime contracts had been awarded to minority contractors within recent years. The City
provided waivers to individual contractors who provided proof that sufficient minority
contractors/subcontractors were either unwilling to participate in the plan or unavailable.
The Court applied the Strict Scrutiny Two Prong test to determine the constitutionality of
the program.

The test is not dependent upon the racial composition of the people

burdened by the racial classification. It assumes that the State is pursuing a remedial
goal that is worthy of warranting the implementation of an affirmative action plan, and
that the means designed to remedy past discrimination practices is compelling enough to

5
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substantiate the fact that there is not possibility that the employer's motives for the racial
classification was stereotypical or based upon racial prejudice. 6
ft was found that the City's plan violated both prongs of the test. The plan was

not justified by a compelling governmental interest, because the record did not reveal any
past evidence of racial discriminatory practices imposed upon minority contractors or
subcontractors during the letting of contracts. The Court found that the City failed to
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest that justified the enactment of the plan.
The factual predicate supporting the plan did not establish the type of identifiable past
discrimination in the City's construction industry that would warrant the race conscious
relief under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 7
It failed the second prong of the test because the 30% set aside program was not
narrowly tailored to accomplish a remedial purpose of remedying past discriminatory
practices, which occurred solely on the basis of the contractors or subcontractor racial
classification. The plan entitled African American, Oriental, or Hispanic entrepreneurs
from virtually anywhere in the United States to be awarded absolute preference over
nonminorities, based solely on the contractors or subcontractors race. 8 It was detennined
that the plan's waiver didn't inquire whether the particular Minority Business Enterprise
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in question seeking racial preference classification had suffered from the effects of past
discrimination practices employed by the City or prime contractors. 9
Wygant v Board of Education

The Wygant case centers around two principles of law, the Strict Scrutiny Two
Prong test and statistical disparity evidence. Specifically, the challenge addresses the
issue of whether the Board of Education's layoff plan is in direct violation of the
Fourteenth amendment, equal protection clause rights of the displaced non-minority
teachers.
The collective bargaining agreement between the Board of Education and the
teacher's union provided that if it became necessary to lay off teachers, those with the
most seniority would be retained. However, the provision also stipulated that at no time
would there be a greater percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the lay
off than minorities. n essence, this meant that during certain school years, non-minority
teachers were laid off, while minority teachers with less seniority were retained.
The Court addressed the issue regarding voluntary adoption of affirmative
action plans by public employers.

The City and its union negotiated a collective

bargaining agreement that established affirmative action provisions in hiring, however it
also protected minority teachers from the effects of downsizing. The Court majority held
that the provision regarding the layoffs was unconstitutional, in that it failed both prongs
of the strict scrutiny standard test.

9

Croson at 471.

The designated plan failed because it was not
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narrowly tailored to address the remedial need and effects of past discrimination. It also
failed because the Board of Education sought to maintain minority hiring levels that were
irrelevant to remedying past employment discrimination practices. 10
It was found that the layoff provision operated to the disadvantage of non-

minorities, because it constituted a classification based upon race. The Court reasoned
that in affirmative action cases, a employer's use of racial classification must be
scrutinized for conflicts with constitutional rights. 11 It must meet the terms of the strict
scrutiny two prong test. It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and
be narrowly tailored to meet the goals of remedying past employment discrimination
practices. 12 However, the presence of societal discrimination alone is not sufficient
evidence to justify a employer's use of racial classification. Convincing evidence of
prior discrimination by the governmental entity involved is required before an employer
is allowed limited use of racial classification for remedial purposes. The District Court
found that the remedial measure was permissible under the equal protection clause as a
remedy for past employment discrimination. It was believe that the presence of minority
teaching faculty would aid in eradicating societal discrimination, by providing positive
role models for minority students. However, the Supreme Court found that the "role
model" theory suggested by the District Court would encourage the Board of Education
to employ discriminatory hiring and lay off practices for periods longer than necessary to
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James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action,'' University of Davis
Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, Winter 1988, 407.
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achieve a legitimate remedial purpose. The use of role models wasn't relative to the
injustices cause by prior discriminatory employment practices. The acknowledgment that
there had been pervasive societal discrimination was not sufficient evidence to justify the
use of race conscious remedial action or imposition of a racially classified remedy. 13
Provided that the layoff provisions purpose was to remedy prior discrimination
practices, the constitutional validity required the District Court to make a factual
determination that the Board of Education had a strong basis in evidence to support the
contention that the implementation of the layoff provision was necessary. 14
The Court requires proof of prior discriminatory history prior to allowing the
restricted use of racial classification and other affirmative action remedial measures to be
imposed as a remedy. There must be a relevant analysis of current and past case history
used to prove discrimination by statistical disparity.

The analysis must focus on

disparities that demonstrate or evidence prior governmental discrirnination. 15 In this case,
it was reasoned that had the plaintiff provided statistical evidence as to the percentage of
qualified minority teachers available in the relevant labor market to demonstrate that the
Board's hiring practice of African American teachers over a period of time had equaled
the percentage employed by the Board, the case would have probably been decided
differently. 16 It was the opinion of the Court that the Board should have had convincing
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evidence to support the contention that an affirmative action program was warranted
prior to implementing the program. 17 The layoff provision was not a governmental
interest and was not narrowly framed to accomplish the goal of eradicating past
discriminatory hiring and promotional practices within the department.
The Supreme Court found that other less intrusive alternatives were available to
accomplish the goal of remedying prior employment discriminatory practices, such as the
adoption of hiring objectives.

Therefore, the layoff provision was not sufficiently

narrowly tailored as a means of accomplishing a legitimate purpose. 18
The Wygant decision reflects the Justice Department's assertion that affirmative
action is restricted to granting remedial measures to a defined group of discrimination
victims. 19 It was the opinion of the Court that the Board should have had convincing
evidence that an affirmative action program was warranted, prior to implementing
Federal Court program. 20 The layoff provision was a governmental interest and was not
narrowly framed to accomplish the goal of eradicating past discriminatory hiring and
promotional practices within the department.
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United States v Paradise

In 1972, it was found that the Alabama Department of Public Safety, herein
after referred to as the "Department" had systematically excluded African Americans
from employment as state troopers for over four decades. The National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) brought action against the Department
challenging the Department's long-standing practice of excluding African Americans
from employment. The United States was joined as a party plaintiff, and Philip Paradise,
Jr., intervened on behalf of a class of African American plaintiffs. The District Court
issued an order imposing a hiring quota and requiring the Department to refrain from
engaging in discrimination in its employment practices, including promotions. The
Department was required to hire one African American trooper for each white trooper
elevated in rank, until African Americans constituted approximately 25% of the state
trooper force. The Court also required that the African Americans who were promoted
were qualified to be promoted in rank. The Court required that the Department provide a
copy of the test used in promotions and to furnish the Court a listing of the eligible
candidates. This was known as the 1972 Order. The defendants appealed the decision,
but the Fifth Circuit upheld the hiring requirement. 21
The Court of Appeals held that the Department did not violate the rights of due
process or equal protection of the white applicants who had higher eligibility rankings
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United States v Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) at 149-50.
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than the African Americans when the quota was implemented. The Department imposed
the 1979 and 1981 decrees.
In 1981, the Department administered a test for the purpose of promoting
candidates to the rank of corporal. The test was administered to 262 applicants, of whom
60 (23%) were African American. Only 5 (8.3%) of the African Americans scored in the
top half of the promotion register, the highest ranking African American was numbered
80 on the promotion eligibility list The United States inquired about the standing of the
consent order. The Department indicate that there was an immediate need to make 8-10
corporal promotions and indicated that it would elevate 16-20 individuals before
construction of a new promotion eligibility listing. 22
Eleven years later, a motion to enforce the 1979 and 1981 decree was filed by
the United States. The United States found that the Department's failure to produce a
promotion plan in compliance with the decrees suggested the possibility that the
Department was engaging in continued discrimination practices. 23 The District Court
found that the Department failed to develop promotion procedures which didn't have an
adverse affect on African Americans. The District Court ordered the Department to
promote one African American trooper for each white trooper elevated in rank, provided
that the African Americans promoted were qualified for the position.

The deadline

suggested that the Department was obligated to continue the program until the
Department implemented an acceptable promotion procedure.

22
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After the U.S. filed the motion to enforce, four white applicants who sought
promotion to corporal rank sought to intervene on behalf of a class composed of those
white applicants who took the proposed corporal's examination and ranked between the
numbers 1-79. The issue at question was whether the 1979 and 1981 decrees and the
sought after relief proposed by the plaintiffs had an adverse affect on their constitutional
rights.
The District Court entered an order in 1983 holding that the Department's
selection procedure had an adverse affect on African American candidates for promotion.
Consequently, the District Court set a deadline for submission of a promotion plan
consisting of at least 15 qualified African American candidates to the rank of corporal in
a manner that would not have an adverse racial impact on minorities. 24
The District Court granted the plaintiffs motion to enforce the 1979 and 1981
decrees and designed another relief mechanism.

The Court held that for a specific

period, 50% of the corporal promotions would be given to qualified African Americans.
The remedial relief was also designed to address the Department's delay in developing
acceptable promotion procedures for all ranks. 25 The Court imposed a 50% promotion
quota in the upper ranks, but maintained that promotions would occur only in cases
where there were qualified African American candidates; if the rank was less than 25%
African American, and provided that the Department had not developed and
implemented an affirmative action promotion plan without adverse impact on
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nonminorities for the relevant rank. 26 The Department was ordered to submit a schedule
to the Court for the development of promotion procedures for all ranks above that of the
entry level.
In 1984, the Department promoted eight African Americans and eight whites to
the position of corporal, pursuant to the District Court's order enforcing the consent
decrees. The Department also submitted to the District Court found that the Department
could promote up to 13 troopers utilizing the promotion procedure and suspended
application of the one-for-one requirement for the promotion purpose. Later in the year,
after approval of the promotion procedure for sergeant, the Court suspended application
of the quota at the sergeant's rank.
The U.S. Supreme Court found that the race conscious relief ordered in this case
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment, however it was found
that the court system could constitutionally employ racial classifications essential to
remedying unlawful discrimination based upon race or ethnicity. Remedying past or
present racial discrimination is a justifiable state interest to warrant the remedial use of a
carefully constructed affirmative action program.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District
Court's order. The Court of Appeals held that the relief at issue was designed to remedy
the present effects of past discrimination. In addition, the relief awarded was found to be
necessary to accomplish the objectives of remedying historical racial imbalances in the
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upper ranks of the Department. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the District Court.

27

The case centers around the legal principles of the strict scrutiny two prong test
and the appropriate use of race conscious remedies in affirmative action programs. The
race conscious relief that was issued as a remedy, was considered to be justified by a
compelling interest in remedying past discrimination practices that permeated entry level
hiring and promotional practices. The Croson case decision was applied to this case.
The enforcement order is supported by the strict scrutiny test, because it was narrowly
tailored to meet the needs of a compelling governmental interest in eradicating past
discriminatory practices and by the societal interest in complying with judgments of the
federal courts. It has been decided that in determining whether race conscious remedies
are appropriate, there are several factors that must be considered. Firs, there must be a
decision as to the necessity of the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies. Second,
there must be a stated term concerning the flexibility and duration of the relief, including
the availability of waiver provisions.

Third, there must be a decision as to the

relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market. Fourth, the impact of the
relief on the rights of third parties must be decided.
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After careful analysis of all of these provisions, the court found that the one to
one promotion requirement was narrowly tailored to serve its purposes, both as applied to
the initial set of promotions to the corporal rank and as a continuing contingent order
with respect to the upper ranks. 29
In this instance, it was found that over a period of four decades, the Department
deliberately sought to systematically exclude African Americans from all positions
including the upper ranks of the Department. This was found to be a flagrant violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. It was determined that the exclusion of African Americans
from entry level positions precluded African Americans from eventually seeking
promotions to upper ranking levels. This also resulted in a departmental hierarchy
exclusively dominated by non-minorities. During the course of court proceedings, it was
found that within 37 years, there had never been an African American trooper employed
by the Department at any level.
The District Court found that the Department deliberately stalled the imposition
of the Decree objectives and deliberately aided the discrimination practices that were
already being perpetuated.

It is also a fact that by 1983, the Department had only

promoted four African American troopers, and that these promotions were made pursuant
to the 1979 Decree, not by the voluntary affirmative action plan that was adopted by the
Department. The Department continued to operate employment practices that excluded
African Americans from promotion opportunities. 30
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The purpose of the order was intended to eliminate the effects of the
Department's "long term, open, and pervasive" discrimination, including the exclusion of
African Americans from all upper levels of rank. The order was also designed to ensure
expeditious compliance with the 1979 and 1981 decrees by inducing the Department to
implement a promotion procedure schedule that would not have an adverse affect on
African Americans. The court also needed to eliminate the effects of the Department's
delay in producing the promotion procedure. 31
It concluded that the imposed remedial action was effective, temporary, and
flexible, because the program applied only to qualified African Americans, provided that
they were available, and only in instances in which the department had a racial parity
need to make promotions.

The Court concluded that the City's affirmative action

program was justified and narrowly tailored to meet the District Court's legitimate
purpose. 32
The Court found that the race conscious relief ordered by the District Court was
justified by a compelling governmental interest in eradicating the Department's
pervasive, systemic, and obstinate discriminatory exclusion of African Americans. The
Department's deliberate employment discrimination has had a profound effect on the
state trooper's upper echelon ranks, by excluding African Americans from competing for
promotions on an equitable basis.

31
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The enforcement of the consent decree is supported by the societal interest of
eradicating a persistent, and long standing history of resisting to abide by the terms of the
order. Remedial relief was only imposed after the Department failed to abide by the
1979 and 1981 consent decrees.
The court mandated "one for one" promotional requirement was judged to be
narrowly tailored to serve the purpose of eradicating racial discrimination in employment
within the Department. This was true of both the initial corporal promotions and as a
"continuing contingent" with respect to employment within the upper ranks of the
Department.
The numerical relief ordered by the District Court was found to bear a proper
relation to the percentage of nonminorities in the relevant work force. The District Court
ordered 50% African American promotions until the ranks achieved 25% African
American representation, whereas the relevant affirmative action labor pool constituted
25% representation. This figure represents an attempt to balance the rights and interests
of all involved parties.
The "one for one" requirement did not impose an unacceptable burden on nonminority applicants. The remediation requirement has only been used on one occasion,
and probably will not be repeated. It doesn't prohibit the employment advancement of
nonminorities, and does not require the promotion of unqualified African Americans over
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qualified non-minority applicants. 33 Therefore, the Court deemed the consent decree to
be flexible, waivable, and temporary in application. 34
Billish v City of Chicago

This case centers around the legal principles of the strict scrutiny two prong test
and sufficient statistical disparity evidence necessary to fulfill the strict scrutiny standard.
In 1973, the U.S. Department of Justice brought civil action against the City of Chicago,

herein after referred to as the "City," alleging that the hiring and promotion practices of
the Chicago Fire Department, herein after referred to as the "CFD", illegally
discriminated against African Americans and Hispanics. At the time of the suit, African
Americans and Hispanics comprised a total of less than 5% of the uniformed personnel in
the CFD. The court entered a interlocutory injunction against the City on the Department
of Justice's discriminatory hiring claims. The City entered into a consent decree in 1974.
This established an interim 50% minority hiring ratio and a long range goal requiring the
City to significantly increase the minority representation of the CFD in a manner directly
reflecting the minority composition of the City. In 1978, minorities comprised
approximately 9% of the CFD's uniformed personnel. In 1979, the District Court granted
a motion to the Department of Justice and ordered that if the new 1979 hiring eligibility
list was used for more than a two year period or 500 eligible names, 50% of all further
hiring would be required to be comprised of minority candidates.
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In 1980, the Department of Justice formally informed the City of its intention to
file a new suit challenging the proposed promotion examinations due to the possibility of
it having a severe adverse impact against minority candidates.
In 1983, the Fire Commissioner ordered the preparation of a new set of
promotion examinations for each of the fire department ranks. The examinations were
given in descending rank order: engineer, lieutenant, captain, and battalion chief In
1987, the Commissioner of Personnel informed the Fire Commissioner that the engineer
and captain promotions were to be made on an affirmative action basis, with the goal of
20% of the persons promoted to the engineer rank should be African American, and an
additional 5% of those promoted were to be of Hispanic origin. 35
White firefighters brought action against the City and various parties.

They

alleged that their rights under the equal protection and due process clauses were violated
by the City's failure to fill all vacancies before retiring its eligibility list and by its
nonrank order promotion of minority fire fighters. In another action, white fire fighters
and their local union brought action challenging the city's affirmative action policy
regarding promotion.
The Billish action was brought by nine white firefighters who were next on the
captain eligibility list when the Fire Commissioner lowered the cut off score to allow the
two minority lieutenants to be promoted in 1987. The plaintiffs challenged the lowering
of the cut off score and the subsequent promotions, as well as the Fire Commissioners
refusal to promote others listed on the 1979 eligibility list. The Chicago Fire Fighters
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suit was brought by the Union and twenty two white firefighters and lieutenants who
were passed over in the affirmative action engineer and captain promotions in 1987. The
cases were consolidated. The plaintiffs sued for violation of their rights under the Equal
Protection Clause. The Billish plaintiffs also asserted a violation of their due process
rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed one case, and the other case was affirmed in part,
reversed and remanded in part. 36
The Court found that the affirmative action policy did not violate principles of
equal protection; firefighters did not have protected property interest in rank order
promotions; and the District Court applied incorrect standards in concluding that
retirement of eligibility list and nonrank order promotion of minority fire fighters did not
violate principles of equal protection.
The court applied the Strict Scrutiny Standard to determine whether it violated
the Equal Protection Clause. The Strict Scrutiny Two Prong Test requires that there must
be a compelling Governmental interest justifying any racial classification and a
demonstration that the means selected to effectuate that objective are narrowly tailored to
meet that goal. 37 Based upon all of the relevant evidence, it was held that the City's
affirmative action plan didn't meet the strict scrutiny two prong test requirements. The
court granted the City's motion for summary judgment.
The Court also decided that the plaintiffs did not have standing to contest the
suit and dismissed certain plaintiffs for lack of standing. They found that the plaintiffs
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did not suffer any direct injury from the non rank order promotions. The fourteen
promoted individuals would not have been promoted, even if they were promoted in
strict rank order. Therefore, the affirmative action plan was necessary.
It was also found that the measures taken to rectify the effects of past

discrimination practices within a state or municipality have been recognized by the courts
to serve as a compelling governmental interest. There must also be a strong basis in
evidence for the affirmative action to support the remedial action. In this action, the
plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that the City violated their rights. 38
The litigation history of the CFD's past hiring and promotion practices
corroborates evidence of past discrimination.

There was also statistical evidence to

support past discrimination. There was evidence of minority under representation by
statistical analysis, which was sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the
City be required to have a strong basis for believing that remedial action was required. 39
The City presented evidence that the difference between the expected percentage of
minority engineers and the actual percentage of minority engineers was 8. 7 standard
deviations, and the difference between the expected percentage of minority captains and
the actual percentage of minority captains was 3.96 standard deviations. The City's
reliance on under representation statistics as part of the evidence lends support to the
strong basis for concluding that remedial action was necessary. There was a compelling
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governmental interest and the affirmative action plan was narrowly tailored to meet the
goals of the remedial plan. 40
A due process claim has two components: there must be a protected property
interest, and the plaintiff must have been deprived of that interest without due process of
law. The court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the claim that there
was an existence of a custom or practice by the City to fill vacancies for captain from the
eligibility list in effect at the time of vacancy. There was insufficient evidence to create a
genuine issue as to the existence of a property interest in rank order promotion. 41
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judt:,'lllent
on the due process claim. With respect to the equal protection claim, the court remanded
the case to District Court as opposed to applying the Strict Scrutiny Standard. The Court
of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for further consideration. 42
Vogel v City of Cincinnati
This case centers around three legal principles with regard to equal protection
clause violation. They are the enforceability of a consent decree, legal standing required
to challenge the enforceability of a consent decree, and the application of the strict
scrutiny standard to the affirmative action plan.
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The Department of Justice on behalf of the United States commenced an action
against the City of Cincinnati, herein after referred to as the "City," the Cincinnati Police
Division and the Cincinnati Civil Service Commission.

They alleged that they had

engaged in firing and promoting practices that discriminated against minorities and
women, which was in direct violation of Title VII.

The collective bargaining

representative of the Cincinnati police officers, the Fraternal Order of Police intervened
in this action. After negotiations, a consent decree was issued.
The consent decree stated that in order to remedy the past discrimination
practices, it established a long term goal of having the proportion of African American
and female police officers directly reflect the approximate proportion of qualified
African Americans and women in the city's work force. The decree also stated that it
would terminate this plan as soon as the long term goal of equal employment was
reached by the Cincinnati Police Division. 43
According to the decree, a new procedure of hiring police recruits was
implemented. The plan called for a revised set of minimum score qualifications in which
candidates scoring at least 60% on the examination were placed on a Open Eligible List.
The City afforded preference to qualified African American and women when needed to
meet the interim goals of the consent decree. The decrees established the criteria in
which the recruits would be composed of 34 % African American and 23 % women.
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The plaintiff, a white male was not selected to become a member of the October
1989 recruiting class, however he was selected as a recruit several months later. The
plaintiff commenced this action against the City seeking restitution of pay, retroactive
seniority and other benefits for the period in which he was denied a position with the
force due to the City's hiring policy. He contended that the City went beyond the terms of
the consent decree by implementing a quota system type of hiring practice. He alleged
that the hiring policy was not in accordance with the terms of the consent decree which
stated, than none of the language of the decree should be interpreted as demanding that
the City hire unnecessary personnel or unqualified employees for available positions or to
satisfy quota requirements. 45 The plaintiff further contends that if the Police
Department's hiring policy is authorized by the consent decree, then the consent decree is
in direct violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court affirmed the summary judgment of the district court dismissing the
plaintiffs' claim against the City. The Court concluded that a consent decree is a contract
founded on the principle that there is an agreement reached between the parties. It should
be designed to preserve the position for which the concerned parties bargained. The
affirmative action plan is nor enforceable directly or in collateral proceedings by
individuals who are not parties to the plan. 46 Consequently, the plan can only be
challenged on the grounds that its substantive provision unlawfully infringed upon the
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rights of the party making the complaint. 47 In this instance, the plaintiffs sought to
collaterally enforce the consent decree according to his personal interpretation of the
decree. The plaintiff was not afforded the right and lacked legal standing to challenge
the City's interpretation of the consent decree.
The plaintiff alleged that the consent decree violated the equal protection
clause. In order to have standing to successfully make a challenge, the plaintiff must be
aggrieved by the judicial action from which it appeals. 48 Since the plaintiff was denied
employment as a result of the affirmative action policy adopted by the City pursuant to
the consent decree, and was not a party to the consent decree, the Court granted the
plaintiff legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of the decree as it applied to
. 49
hIm.

The City's affirmative action plan required only the hiring of qualified African
Americans and women, it did not forbid non-minorities from employment. The plaintiff
contended that the affirmative action plan required the selection of unqualified African
Americans and women over qualified non-minorities.

The City's adopted plan was

considered to be a fair and reasonable policy of affirmative action. The City's affirmative
action plan survived the strict scrutiny standard because there was strong statistical
evidence to support the contention that a remedial action was necessary. 50 There was
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evidence of widespread statistical imbalance and disparity demonstrated in the past
hiring practices of the City. This was true of both the hiring and promotional practices
enacted for African Americans and women. Therefore, the Court found that the plan
sought to eradicate the current effects of the City's prior discriminatory hiring practice,
and found that the affirmative action plan was narrowly tailored to achieve the prescribed
goals of the consent decree. 51
California Regents v Bakke

This case centers around the legal principle of the strict scrutiny standard, racial
classification, and the burden of proof required to substantiate racial classification. The
relationship between the requirement of strict judicial scrutiny and violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment is contrasted.
The Medical School of the University of California at Davis, herein after
referred to as a the "Medical School", had two admissions programs established for
entering medical students. One was the regular admissions program and the other was
the special admissions program, designed for disadvantaged and minority students. The
terms of the regular admissions program required that the candidate's undergraduate
grade point average be at least 2.5 or above on a scale of 4.0. Approximately one out of
six candidates was granted an interview, which was rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by each
of the committee members. The candidate's ratings were based upon summaries of the
interviews, overall grade point averages, science course grade averages, MCAT (Medical
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College Admissions Test) scores, letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities,
and other biological information pertinent to the applicant. After consideration of all of
the material was completed, the admissions committed extended offers of admission to
the candidates judged to be capable of successfully completing medical school. The
special program was administered by a separate committee. The 1973 and 1974 medical
school applications included a section on the application that requested the applicant to
state whether he/she wanted to be considered a member of the "economically
disadvantaged" or members of a "minority" group.
different manner than the regular candidates.

The applicants were rated in a

However, the special admissions

candidates did not have to meet the 2.5 grade point average criteria that the regular
admission candidates had to satisfy.
During a four year period, 63 minority students were admitted to the medical
school under the terms of the special program and 44 were admitted under the regular
program. However, no white student who classified themselves as being "disadvantaged"
was admitted to the special program.
A white student (Bakke) applied for admission the medical school on two
occasions. He applied first in 1973 and again in 1974. The student scored 468 out of a
possible score of 500 on the MCAT in 1973. He scored 549 out of a possible score of
600 in 1974. The reason that he was rejected in 1973 centered around the fact that the
respondent applied late in the admissions process and no general applicants with scores
less than 470 were accepted at the time that the respondent's application was processed
and completed. During the 1973 submission, four special admissions slots were unfilled
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at the time that the respondent's application was rejected.

In 1974, Even though the

respondent applied early in the admissions process, he was rejected for an undisclosed
reason. It is also found that in neither year was his name placed on the discretionary
waiting list, nor admitted to the special program.
The respondent filed this action after being rejected for the second time. He
filed this action in state court for mandatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief to compel
his admission to the Medical School of the University of California at Davis.

The

respondent alleged that the medical school's admission program operated to exclude him
from admission consideration on the basis of his race and in violation of the respondent's
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a provision of the California
Constitution, and§ 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Trial Court found that the special admissions program acted as a racial
quota system, because the students competing in the special program competed against
each other as opposed to competing with all admissions candidates in both the regular
and special admissions programs. The Trial Court also held that the admissions program
operated as a quota system, because the candidates being considered in this program had
16 out of 100 admissions seats reserved specifically for them, It held that the special
program violated the Federal and State Constitutions and Title VI because the petitioner
(school) was prohibited from taking race into consideration in making admissions
decisions. The California Supreme Court held that the school's admission process under
the special program violated the Federal and State Constitutions and Title VI and ordered
the admittance of the respondent to the medical school.
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the California Supreme Court
decision and ordered the respondent's admission into the medical school and invalidated
the petitioner's special admissions program. However, it reversed the California Supreme
Court's decision with respect to special program admission. It prohibited the petitioner
from taking race into consideration as a factor in its future admissions decisions. 52
The court found that racial classification is inherently suspect, requiring strict
judicial scrutiny. 53 The Strict Scrutiny Standard requires that there must be a "compelling
governmental interest to justify any racial classification and a showing that the means
selected to effectuate that objective be narrowly tailored to meet that goal. 54 The Court
sympathized with the Medical School at the University of California at Davis's goal of
achieving racial diversity on the campus. The Court even held that attempting to achieve
racial diversity among the student body is sufficiently compelling to justify consideration
of race in admissions decisions under some circumstances. The petitioner's (medical
school's) special admissions program, which forecloses consideration to people similar to
the respondent, is unnecessary to the achievement of this compelling goal. Therefore, it
makes it invalid under the terms of the equal protection clause. 55
The United States Supreme Court also rationed that the petitioner was unable to
satisfy the burden of proof that was required to prove that the respondent would not have
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California Regents v Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) at 265-66.

53

Bakke at 26 7.

54

Krupa at 507.

55

Bakke at 267.
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been considered for admission even if there had not been a special admissions program
implemented by the medical school. 56
Krupa v New Castle County

This case centers around the legal principles of the strict scrutiny two prong test,
statistical disparity, and due process of law.
White police officers filed an employment discrimination claim challenging
Delaware County's Police Department, herein after referred to as the "County,"
promotion of a African American police officer. The police department's policy dictated
that after serving as a patrolman for 12 years, automatic promotion to the corporal level
is automatically granted. The Delaware statute states that patrolmen are afforded the
right to seek command position promotions. Promotions are based upon competitive
. .
57
competency and fiitness exammatlons.
The County and the Fraternal Order of Police, New Castle County Lodge No. 5
(the plaintiffs' collective bargaining agent) entered into an agreement inter alia, that a
merit system be utilized by the County in accordance with the affirmative action plan.
The County's objective was to impose equitable supervisory promotions to qualified
women and/or minorities, provided that they possess a validated promotional tool to be
utilized in making the promotion decisions. 58

5

6Bakke at 265-66.

57

Krupa at 499.

58

Krupa at 499.

6!
§ 1183 (a)( 1) of Title 9 of the Delaware Code provides, inter alia that it was
illegal to either favor or discriminate against individuals applying for County positions on
the basis of race, color, national origin, political, religious opinions, or affiliations. 59
The affirmative action plan stated that when a sergeant's position became
available, the only applicants to be considered for the County promotional consideration
would be those applicants who were placed in the first band. It was also stipulated that
even those applicants who were not in the first band would be considered qualified for
the sergeant's position, provided that no one applied from a protected class group, who
was also a member of the certified list of groups. Protected class members are defined as
including minorities, physically challenged individuals, and women. If there were not any
protected class members on the certified list, then the 3 highest ranking members of the
protected class from a lower band would be added to the certification list. The Chief of
Police had the discretion to select any one of those individuals on the certification list for
the available position.
During the 1984 list, the plaintiffs applied for the sergeant position. There were
six minorities eligible to take the examination. Eighty five people passed the exam.
Band 1 did not include any members of the protected class. Consequently, protected
class members from lower bands were added to the certification list. Two positions were
given to white males scoring originally in Band 1.

59

The third position was given to

§1183 (a) (1) of Title 9 of the Delaware Code.

68

Officer Bryant, an African American man who had scored between the 45th and 69th
percentile on the certification list and placed in the third band. 60
The 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause states that States are prohibited
from enforcing or creating legislation denying equal protection of the laws under the
constitution. 61 In this instance, the Strict Scrutiny Standard was applied to the County's
affirmative action plan. This standard was applicable to affirmative action plans that
were challenged regardless of whether the challengers were members of the protected
class. 62 The standard requires that there must be a "compelling governmental interest to
justify any racial classification and a showing that the means selected to effectuate that
objective are narrowly tailored to meet that goal. 63
There must be a constitutional showing justifying the County's affirmative
action plan. Public employers are required to identify racial discrimination, public or
private, with some specificity, before they are allowed to use race conscious remediation.
Due to the absence of evidence demonstrating prior discrimination in hiring by the
County, they could not justify the promotion plan that was based upon raw general
population statistical imbalance.

There was no prior evidence of past governmental

discrimination, therefore the plan was considered unconstitutional. 64

°Krupa at 499.

6

61

U.S. Constitution amend. XIV,§ 1.

62

Krupa at 497.

63

Krupa at 507.

64

Krupa at 511.
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The plaintiffs were denied summary judgment on § 1983 because it had already
been determined that the plaintiffs' Equal Protection Clause rights under the Fourteenth
amendment were violated. It was not necessary to prove that a violation of due process
had occurred. The Court held that in instances where an alleged act of discrimination
does not concern the impairment of [the making and enforcement of contracts] § 1981
prov1"des no re l"ie f .65
The District Court granted the County's motion for summary judgment with
respect to the plaintiffs claims under section 1981. The Court also granted the plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment with respect to the equal protection clause violation. The
Court held that the County's Plan was unconstitutional, because of the Equal Protection
Clause violation, which is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
However, the County's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's section 1983 was
denied. 66

Jansen v City of Cincinnati
This case centers around the enforcement of a consent decree and evidence
supporting the strict scrutiny test requirements. These are necessary when deciding the
constitutionality of an affirmative action plan.
The facts of the case surround the issue of white firefighter candidates filing
action claiming that their constitutional rights were violated when the city continued to

65

Krupa at 519.

66

Krupa at 520-21.

70

use the provision set forth in a consent decree to assure that a certain percentage of
minority representation was achieved. The consent decree set forth various measures to
be taken by the City of Cincinnati, herein after referred to as the "City," for the purpose
of integrating minorities into the fire department

The consent decree mandated the

pursuance of an overall work force composed of 18% minority representation. 67
The Rule of Three does not guarantee employment to candidates ranking highest
on the eligibility list, however it does guarantee employment consideration.

The

plaintiffs contend that because they scored higher than any of the minorities appointed,
that they should have been hired by the fire department The plaintiffs sought restitution
relief in the form of immediate job placement and back pay starting from the day of the
alleged discrimination.

68

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dissolved the
hiring provision in the decree.

Upon appeal, the US. Court of Appeals vacated the

decision and remanded the case to the District Court.
The Court found that the dual lists did not abridge the plaintiffs constitutional
rights, because each of the minorities that were placed on the eligible list was qualified to
be hired by the fire department
evaluation components.

They had successfully completed each of the five

Therefore, the Court found that the dual lists were

constitutional. 69

67

Jansen v City of Cincinnati, 977 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1992)at 239.

68

Jansen at 241.

69

Jansen at 24 L

71

The Court found that the continued effectiveness of the consent decree
depended upon whether the Department had operated in good faith with the
desegregation decree since its inception, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination
had been eliminated to the fullest extent possible. 70 The Court of Appeals found that the
numerical goals established within the consent decree helped to strengthen the overall
objectives of the decree. The Appeals Court found that the District Court erred when it
neglected past claims of discrimination. It failed to determine whether the vestiges of
past discrimination had been eliminated to the fullest extent possible. 71 The Court felt
that the goals of the consent decree had not been met and should remain in effect until
they were satisfied.
The next six cases concern the issue of Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII
violations.

Title VII
A Title VII violation is a violation of the constitutional rights afforded to U.S.
citizens under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under Title VII, preferential gender and/or
racial based treatment and racial and/or gender quotas are banned.

Quotas are only

required in instances where the courts have judged an organization guilty of perpetuating
past discrimination practices. 72

70

Jansen at 244.

71

Jansen at 246.

72

Harry E. Groves and Albert Broderick, "Affirmative Action Goals Under Title

VII: Statute, Legislative History, and Policy," Thurgood Marshall Law Review, 29.

72

Under Title VII, an affirmative action plan must be justified by the existence of
a "manifest imbalance" in a traditionally segregated job category. 73 Once this imbalance
is demonstrated, the court is required to consider whether the rights of the person
discriminated against are "unnecessarily trammeled" by the affirmative action plan. 74 The
normal method of establishing an intentional discrimination claim under Title VII,
consists of providing initial proof of a prima facie case and corresponding evidence to
support the burden of proof provided by the plaintiff. 75 However, in instances in which
the plaintiff provides direct evidence of discrimination, however, strict adherence to the
McDonnell Douglass test is not required.

76

The Supreme Court has approved of the

general analytical outline of McDonnell Douglass to the extent that it requires the
employer to demonstrate a nondiscriminatory rationale, such as the existence of an
affirmative action plan, as the basis for supporting a facially discriminatory decision. 77
The following six cases outline affirmative action cases alleging violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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Johnson v Transportation Agency of Santa Clara, 107 S.Ct. 1442 (1987) at

74

Johnson at 1455.
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McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S .. 792, 802-04 (1981).

76

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).

77

Johnson at 616.

1452.

73

Johnson v Transportation Agency Santa Clara County

This is the case that is held in comparison when deciding whether an affirmative
action plan is in violation of Title VII. The Supreme Court decided that judicial scrutiny
is utilized in instances in which there is clarification needed to determine whether an
affirmative action plan is remedial or motivated by unfounded notions of racial
inferiority or racial politics. 78 In making this determination, the Court developed a two
prong test to judge the validity of the plan.

The test stipulates that ( 1) the racial

classification used in drafting the plan must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) the means chosen by the State must be narrowly tailored to remedy the
current effects of past vestiges of racial discrimination. 79 The legal principles involved
are the strict scrutiny two prong test and manifest imbalance.
The Court concluded that there must be substantial evidence to support the
State's determination that remedial measures are appropriate and that other alternative
measures have been explored. 80 In making this determination, evidence of gross
statistical imbalances with regard to minority or gender representation is sufficient to
satisfy a Title VII prima facie requirement. 81
In this case, the Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, herein after
referred to as the "Agency," established an affirmative action plan designed to remedy

78

Jansen at 244.

79

Jansen at 246.

80

Vogel at 599.

81

Hazelwood School District v U.S., 433 U.S. 299.
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past segregation practices with regard to hiring and promoting minorities and females.
This was a voluntary affirmative action plan.

The plan provided inter alia, that in

deciding on promotions for traditionally segregated positions that have significantly been
underrepresented by women, the Agency was authorized to consider the sex of a
qualified applicant for the position. The plan did not have a scope detailing the specific
number of minorities and/or females positions to be set aside. However the plan required
that short-range goals be established and annually adjusted for a more accurate guide
reflecting employment decisions. The Agency announced the position vacancy of road
dispatcher. When this announcement was made, none of the positions listed under the
job categorization of "Skilled Craft Worker" was held by a woman. During the review
process, two qualified candidates were considered for the position. One was a male and
the other considered was a female. Both were considered well qualified for the position.
The female notified the County's Affirmative Action Office because she believed that her
employment consideration would have received unfavorable reviews.
The Affirmative Action Office responded by contacting the Agency Affirmative
Action Coordinator, whom the Agency's plan held responsible for keeping the Director
abreast of affirmative action opportunities for the Agency to accomplish under its plan's
objectives. During this time, the Agency did not have any women employed in any
Skilled Craft position, and had never employed a woman as a road dispatcher.

The

Affirmative Action Coordinator recommended to the Director of the Agency to promote
the female candidate.
dispatcher.

The female candidate was promoted to the position of road

75

The petitioner, a male employee who was passed over for promotion in favor of
the female employee brought Title VII action against the Agency. He filed a complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that he had been denied
the promotion on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.
The Court found that the petitioner bore the burden of establishing the invalidity
of the Agency's Affirmative Action Plan. After the plaintiff had established a prima facie
case that either racial and/or gender classifications had been taken into account in an
employer's employment decision, the burden shifted to the employer [defendant] to bear
the burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision. 82 The existence
of the affirmative action plan provided the rationale basis for the satisfaction of the
burden of proof requirement.
The consideration of the sex of the applicants for the specific job is considered
to be justified if a "manifest imbalance" exists that reflects the under representation of
women in job categories that are traditionally segregated. In determining whether an
imbalance exists that would justify the consideration of sex or race, a statistical
comparison of the employer's labor force percentage of minorities or women with the
percentage of minorities and/or women available in the area labor market or general
population is appropriate in analyzing jobs that require special training. 83 However, in
this case the comparison involved a job that required special training. The comparison
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Johnson at 1448.

83

Johnson at 1452.

76

must be made between those in the labor force who possess the relevant qualifications
sought for the position with those employed by the employer.
The requirement that the "manifest imbalance" relates to a traditionally
segregated job category assures that racial and/or gender preferential treatment factors
will be taken into account in a manner consistent with Title VII's purpose of eliminating
the effects of employment discrimination, and that the interests of non-minority or male
employees not benefiting from the plan would not be unduly infringed upon. 84 In this
case, the plan directed that annual short-term goals be formulated to provide a more
realistic indication of the degree to which sex should be taken into account in filling the
position in question.
The affirmative action plan stipulated that the established goals for each
division should not be construed as quota requirements to be achieved. 85 However the
plan authorized that consideration be given to affirmative action concerns when
evaluating the quality of applicants. The Agency's plan had the express intention of
attaining a balanced work force, but not maintaining it in perpetuity. The Agency's plan
required that women compete with all qualified candidates, not simply other women. No
applicant was automatically excluded from consideration, because all candidates were
weighed against those of the other candidates. There was substantial evidence to support
the fact that the Agency sought to take a moderate step towards eliminating the
imbalance in its female and minority work force. This was considered to be a realistic

84

Johnson at 1452.

85

Johnson at 1455

77

approach towards guidance for employment decisions, while providing minimal intrusion
on the legitimate expectations of other employees. The Agency did not earmark any
positions, because sex was only one of the criteria that was taken into account in
evaluating qualified applicants for positions.

The Agency had no intention of

maintaining a system whose work force composition was dictated by rigid numerical
standards. 86
The decision to promote the female candidate for the position was not dictated
by the sole factor of her gender. The decision to promote her was made pursuant to an
affirmative action plan that represented a moderate, flexible, case-by-case approach to
effectuating a gradual improvement in the representation of minorities and women in the
Agency's work force. The plan was fully consistent with Title VII, because it contains all
of the contribution that voluntary employer action can make in eliminating the vestiges of
discrimination in the workplace. 87 Even though race is considered as a classification
necessitating the application of the strict scrutiny standard, gender is not considered
suspect. Gender violations are judged by using a intermediate constitutional standard. 88
Firefighters v Stotts

The legal principle involved in this case concerns a bona fide seniority plan, the
enforcement of a consent decree, and the scope of judicial authority.

86

Johnson at 1457.

87

Johnson at 1457.

88

Johnson at 1457.

7.8

The respondent in this case was an African American member of the Memphis
Tennessee Fire Department, herein after referred to as the "Department." The respondent
and another petitioner charged that the Department and certain other city officials
engaged in practices of making hiring and promotion decisions on the basis of race in
violation of inter alia, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 89 A consent decree was
entered with the purpose of remedying the Department's minority hiring and promotion
practices, as it related to African American employees.
The District Court entered and approved an order preliminary enjoining the
Department from abiding by its seniority system in making the determination as to who
would be laid off as a result of financial constraints, since the proposed cuts would have
a racially discriminatory effect and the seniority system was not a bona fide system.
The Department presented a modified layoff plan, which was directed at
protecting African American employees, which was court approved. Layoffs pursuant to
the modified plan were then enacted. The result of this action caused white employees
with more seniority than African American employees to be laid off, whereas the
alternative seniority system would have called for the layoffs of African American
employees with less seniority. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and held that
even though the District Court erred in holding that the seniority system was not a bona

89

Chicago Firefighters, 736 F.Supp. at 929.

79
fide one, it had properly acted in modifying the consent decree. However, the Supreme
Court reversed the court decision. 90
The Supreme Court held that the case was not moot provided that the parties
involved have a concrete interest in the outcome of the litigation. 91 The Court believed
that a month's salary was not a negligible item for those affected by the injunction, and
the loss of a month's competitive seniority might determine who gets future promotions,
and who is laid off if there are future staff reductions.
The Department's plan was considered a bona fide plan. The City was not at
fault for following the seniority plan expressed in its agreement with the union. The
Court of Appeals proposed a settlement theory, advocating that the strong policy favoring
voluntary settlement of Title VII actions permitted consent decrees that encroached on
seniority systems. 92 However the Supreme Court held that this theory was inapplicable
when there wasn't a settlement with respect to the disputed issue. The approved decree
didn't award competitive seniority to the minority system.
The District Court enjoined the City of Memphis from applying a seniority
policy in a manner that would decrease the percentage of African Americans employed
by the Memphis Fire Department.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the

decision, concluding that the injunction was an appropriate remedy for enforcing the
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Inter alia literally means "among other things." Oran's Dictionary of the Law,

Daniel Oran, J.D., 1983.
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Powell v McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1986) at 496-98.
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McCormack at 496-98.
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consent decree. The Court concluded that the District Court's injunction was invalid
regardless of the intent to enforce the terms of the consent decree. 93
According to the majority Supreme Court opinion, the primary issue concerned
whether the District Court exceeded its judicial authority when it issued a preliminary
injunction that required white employees to be laid off when other applicable seniority
systems would have called for the layoff of less senior African American employees. 94
The Court majority dissented with the Court of Appeals assessment that the consent
decree modification was within the judicial authority of the District Court.

The Court

concluded that the City of Memphis didn't consent to be enjoined from making layoffs
which decreased the percentage of African American employees.

The modification

altered the application of the seniority system and was held to be outside of the
jurisdictional authority of the Court. Although the consent decree in this case didn't
include retroactive seniority, the Court placed a lot of emphasis on the fact that there was
no evidence that any African Americans protected from layoffs had been victims of
discrimination. Therefore, there was no award of competitive seniority made to any of
them.

The Court perceived the modification to be an infringement on the vested

seniority rights of non-minority firefighters.

The Court majority considered a

requirement of discriminatory proof by the plaintiffs, being consistent with Title VII's
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James Jones, Jr., "The Origins of Affirmative Action", University of Davis
Law Review, 411.
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Louise Jackson Williams, "Last Hired, First Fired - Rights Without Remedies:
Firefighters v Stotts", Detroit Col1ege of Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 215, 1985, 230.

81

"make whole" provision, regardless of the fact that the plaintiffs didn't request make
whole relief in the consent decree. 95
Surprisingly, the Court decision did not mention methods of enforcing the
consent decree or how it would effect the plaintiffs rights under the decree.

Three

Justices dissented in their court opinion, considering the issue to be moot because the
issue was no longer controversial or in question. They concluded that the Court should
have considered the issue of whether the fire department's proposed layoffs violated the
terms of the consent decree. The justices considered the focus of addressing the wrong
issue to be a fundamental procedural error. 96

Gonzales v Police Department. City of San Jose

This case involves the legal principles of consent decree enforcement and
statistical disparity evidence.
The plaintiff-appellant, an Hispanic police officer appealed a judgment denying
his claim of racial discrimination. He sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The plaintiff had been employed by the Police Department of the City of San Jose,
herein after referred to as the "Department." During the course of the officer's twelve
year tenure, the plaintiff had received over thirty written commendations, had varied
work assignments, and had passed both the oral and written examinations qualifying him
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Louise Jackson Williams, "Last Hired, First Fired - Rights Without Remedies:
Firefighters v Stotts", Detroit College of Law Review, 232.
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for promotionability. The promotion list was effective for a two year period. The City of
San Jose, California, herein after referred to as the "City," adopted an affirmative action
plan to eradicate racial imbalances in employment.
The plaintiff was a member of the protected class and the provisions of the plan
were in effect at the time that he sought promotion to the rank of sergeant.

The

Department on four separate occasions failed to promote the plaintiff There is evidence
to support the case that from 1980-1982, one out of eleven Hispanic officers was
promoted to sergeant.

There is also evidence to support the contention that the

Department failed to comply with the requirement to notify the City's Affirmative Action
Officer in writing in each instance in which it promoted a non-minority over the plaintiff
The District Court judge made no mention of the affirmative action plan, and relied upon
promotion rates for Hispanics during the period after the appellant filed his complaint,
which showed an increase in Hispanic representation when he rendered the court
decision. 97
The Court majority held that the District Court failed to take into account the
fact that there was substantial evidence to support the fact that there were material,
uncontroverted and repeated violations of San Jose's Affirmative Action Plan. Even
though there was an affirmative action plan in place which required the City to notify the
Affirmative Action Officer when positions became available, the City refused to comply
with the requirement. The City continued to promote nonminorities over the plaintiff
and failed to comply with the terms of the consent decree on four separate occasions.
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Firefighters v Stotts, 104 S.Ct 2576 (1984) at 2576.
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This was sufficient evidence to support the plaintiff's allegation that his rights under
Title VII had been violated.
Gonzales discussed the City's reluctance to comply with the terms of the
mandatory consent decree during his post trial brief, and also included a detailed
discussion of the discrimination issue. However, the District Court failed to note this in
the Court record. The Court found that even though there was substantial evidence to
support the contention that there was an affirmative action plan violation, the failure to
adhere to the terms of an affirmative action plan was not a per se prima facie violation of
Title VII. 98
Each time that the City failed to comply with the Title VII requirements, the
Affirmative Action Officer became empowered to request that the Department change its
promotion decision and to refer the matter to the City Manager if the Department refused
to change its decision. There was no mention of the Department's violation within the
testimony, supporting the contention that the District Court erred in not considering a
highly relevant and probative aspect of the case. 99
The District Court's second error concerned the fact that it relied on statistical
evidence which supported the contention that the Police Department had a generally
good record with regard to the promotion of Hispanics from June 1977 to March 1987.
The problem with taking this evidence into account, is the fact that most of the evidence
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Gonzales v Police Department, City of San Jose, California, 901 F.2d 758 (9th

Cir. 1990) at 760.
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the Court considered concerns a period after Gonzales filed his initial complaint, and is
therefore considered irrelevant Minority employees were promoted just prior to the trial,
not during the time that the plaintiff experienced flagrant discrimination. This fact did
not support the defendant, nor did it render the case moot

There was evidence to

support the fact that such efforts as increasing the representation of an underrepresented
group were deemed to be equivocal in purpose, motive, and permanence, and therefore
taken into account when deciding upon the validity of the case. 100 Statistical evidence
should not have been taken into consideration, and it was the opinion of the Court that
the District Court erred when it relied upon the statistical findings of fact and conclusions
of law.

Consequently, the decision was vacated and the case was remanded to the

District Court for reconsideration. 101

Hammon v Barry

This case concerns the Title Vil legal principles of legal standing to challenge
the affirmative action plan and manifest imbalance of the racial composition of the
workplace.
This is a challenge to an Affirmative Action Plan employed by a fire
department.

100

The U.S. District Court upheld race conscious hiring provisions and an

Gamble v Birmingham Southern Railroad Co., 514 F.2d 678, 683 (5th Cir.

1975) (quoting Johnson v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491F.2d1364, 1376-77 n. 36
(5th Cir. 1974)
101

Gonzales at 760-62.
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appeal was taken. The District of Columbia Fire Department hired African Americans
for entry level positions on average 50% per year since 1969. Since 19 81, an average of
75+ % of hired fire fighters have been African American. As of 1984, 37% of the fire
fighting force was African American. The appellant alleges that the relevant labor force
consists of persons between the ages of 20-28 years old, who were located within the
boundaries of the District of Columbia, but not within the Washington metropolitan area.
The Court initially upheld race conscious hiring, noting the Johnson v Agency of
Santa Clara case. Then the decision was reversed upon appeal. The United States Court
of Appeals has denied the petition for rehearing, letting the appealed decision not to
uphold race conscious hiring decision stand. 102
The Court found that in instances where there is an alleged violation based upon
the same set of facts, the statutory and constitutional issues are closely interwoven for
review. Therefore, there is standing to challenge the constitutionality of the affirmative
action plan's hiring provisions, with respect to Title VII and ancillary constitutional
claims under the 5th and 14th amendment. The Attorney General is granted authority to
bring suit providing there is justification to support the belief that individuals engaged in
patterns of restricting another person's constitutional guarantees, secured by [Title VII],
and that the practice is of a nature that is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights,
the Attorney General may bring a civil action in an effort to request the relief that he/she
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Hammon v Barry, 826 F.2d 73 (1987) at 73.
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deems appropriate to msure the full enjoyment of the individual's constitutional
guarantees. 103
Even though, there was an undisputed fact that the Department was officially
segregated in the 1950's, as of 4/84, 37% of the District of Columbia firefighters were
African American. It is irrelevant that the overwhelming majority of African American
fire fighters hailed from the Washington Metropolitan area, as opposed to the inner city.
There is no "manifest imbalance", because there is no suggestion that the Department
acted in a discriminatory fashion by hiring from the entire metropolitan area. Hiring is
based upon mandatory racial quotas imposed by the federal government, as opposed to
select geographical areas. 104 It was irrelevant that the overwhelming majority of African
American fire fighters hailed from the Washington Metropolitan area, as opposed to the
inner city.
Local 93 v City of Cleveland

This case centers around the legal principle of enforcement of a voluntary
affirmative action plan.
An association of African American and Hispanic fire fighters brought a class
action suit against the City to redress alleged past and present discrimination practices by
the city fire department in promotional practices. Due to failed negotiations regarding the
adoption of a consent decree, the local 93 union intervened in the matter. The District
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Hammon at 82.

104

Hammon at 77.

Court for the Northern District of Ohio adopted the consent degree, and the labor union
appealed the decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and a writ of certiori
was requested by the local union. 105 The petition for certiori was granted by the United
States Supreme Court.

106

The Court found that the Title VII enforcement provision, which precludes the
Court from entering an order requiring an employer to grant relief to an employee who
suffered adverse job action if action was taken for any reason other than discrimination
on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin does not preclude entry of
consent decree that may benefit individuals who are not actual victims of an employer's
discriminatory practices. 107 The section was further clarified to be interpreted as meaning
that employers may make employment considerations for any reason, except when such
decisions violate the substantive provisions of Title VII. 108 Therefore, the extent of the
limitations placed upon all of the parties and the federal court to ensure that the
provisions are being met, did not restrict the employer or unions from entering into
voluntary affirmative action plans ensuring the implementation of the consent decree. A
consent is not an order within meaning of enforcement provision of Title VII, the limits
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of the agreement are found outside of the section. Intervening union's consent was not
required to obtain court approval of a consent decree.

An intervenor is allowed to

present evidence and to have its objections made public, however, it does not have the
authority to act as an impediment to the adoption of the consent decree merely by
~
. to grant consent to the decree. 109
re1usmg

The Department's plan was considered a bona fide plan. The City was not at
fault for following the seniority plan expressed in its agreement with the union. The
Court of Appeals proposed a settlement theory, that the strong policy favoring voluntary
settlement of Title VII actions permitted consent decrees that encroached on seniority
systems. 110 However, the Supreme Court held that this theory was inapplicable when
there wasn't a settlement with respect to the disputed issue. The approved decree didn't
award competitive seniority to the minority system. The Title VII enforcement provision
which precluded the court from entering an order requiring an employer to grant relief to
an employee who suffered adverse job action, provided that the action was taken for any
reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin
does not preclude entry of a consent decree that may benefit individuals who are not
actual victims of employer's discriminatory practices.
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Local 93 at 3079.
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Stotts at 2576.
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Local 93 at 3063.
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Andrews v City of Johnstown

The legal principle involved is the enforcement of an affirmative action plan.
The facts of the case found that upon recommendation made by the Department head to
the Mayor of Johnstown, the City of Johnstown hired a white individual for the position
of Enterprise Development Coordinator.

The plaintiff provided proof that he had

maintained a resume on file with the City's Affirmative Action Council Officer. The
plaintiff met all of the qualification criteria, however the position was given to a lesser
qualified white applicant. As pursuant to a policy adopted by the City of Johnstown, the
plan required that the City's Affirmative Action Officer receive notification of job
openings at least five days prior to any action being taken regarding appointments.
In this case, neither was the Affirmative Action Officer notified, nor was the
position advertised in any local publication. The plaintiff received notice of the position
availability after reading the appointment announcement notice that was placed in the
local newspaper. The plaintiff argued that had he known about the availability of the
position, he would have applied for the position. However, the City failed to follow its
own plan in hiring for the position in question. The plaintiff filed a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC, and the EEOC in tum rendered a right to sue letter to the
defendant. 112
The Court opinion held that the position was not within the classification of
positions that would be ordinarily exempted because of it being a political appointment.
The evidence did not support the claim that the position was a policy making position,
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Andrews v City of Johnstown, 669 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. Pa. 1987) at 128.
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therefore making it exempt under affirmative action.

It was a ministerial position

requiring the authorization of the Enterprise Development Area Initiative. 113
Some cases challenge both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Cases Involving Equal Protection Clause and Title VII Violation
Allegations
The remaining two cases concern claims against the Fourteenth amendments
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These cases
specifically address the issue of the violation meeting the requirement of the Strict
Scrutiny Two Prong test and manifest imbalance.
Analysis of a claim of an equal protection violation is made by utilizing the
"Strict Scrutiny Two Prong" test.

The standard stipulates that preference given to

minorities in affirmative action court decisions must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest that is achieved only through narrowly tailored means.

Court

sanctioned preferential employment consideration are required to serve a compelling
governmental interest of remedying past vestiges of racial and/or gender discrimination.
Analysis of a Title VII claim requires that an affirmative action plan be justified
by the existence of a "manifest imbalance" in a traditionally segregated job category.

114

Once this imbalance is demonstrated, the court is required to consider whether the rights
of the person discriminated against were "unnecessarily trammeled" by implementation

113

Andrews at 129.

114

Johnson at 1452.
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of the affirmative action plan. 115 In order to establish an intentional discrimination claim
under Title VII, the plaintiff must provide initial proof of a prima facie case and
corresponding evidence to support the burden of proof 116
Cunico v Pueblo School District

This case involves both the equal protection clause challenge and a Title VII
challenge. This case concerns the principles of law: Strict Scrutiny Two Prong Test and
manifest imbalance.
The facts of this case state that the plaintiff, a white social worker was
employed by the Colorado Board of Education, herein after referred to as the "Board."
Her status during the 1981-82 school year was tenured. The plaintiff testified that she
understood the term, "tenure" to imply that she had received jobs security within her
position.
The Board found it necessary to reduce its work force due to financial
difficulties during the 1981-82 school year.

In order to minimize the amount of

disruption of actual classrooms, the district initially decided to cancel all social worker
contracts throughout the district. The Board modified the decision upon learning that
state law required the retention of at least two social workers.
The Board developed a policy governing its reduction in force decisions, which
included a written policy and appeal procedure. The policy also provided during such

115

Johnson at 1455.
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McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S .. 792, 802-04 ( 1981 ).

92

reduction in force actions, the District would make a reasonable effort to maintain at
least a percentage of minority teachers employed by the District. The contracts of the
terminated teachers within each area were scheduled to be canceled according to the
seniority of their probationary status, and then followed by the least tenured teachers.
Accordingly, all six social worker's contracts were canceled and each requested
separate hearings. They retained the two most senior social workers. One of the social
workers, a African American man objected to his contract cancellation, on grounds that
he believed that the District had engaged in discriminatory practices by excluding
African Americans from administrative level positions within the district. The Board
·accepted the hearing officers recommendations to retain the African American social
worker and rescinded the termination of his contract.
The plaintiff brought discriminatory action after the school district decided to
retain the less senior African American social worker, as well as the contract of a
Hispanic social worker. The plaintiff was eventually rehired, but filed a complaint with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging discrimination. She exhausted
her appeals and initiated a federal suit.
The District Court of Colorado entered judgment for the plaintiff, but reduced
the plaintiffs' award. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that: ( l) the decision to rehire
African American social workers after discharging two senior teachers was unjustified
and constituted discriminatory action against plaintiff who had more seniority (2) back

93.

pay was an appropriate remedial award, (3) appeal was not groundless at to justify
objective bad faith while supporting award of appellate attorney fees to plaintiff. 117
The Court found that there was no compelling governmental interest, therefore
it failed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test. The action was unjustifiable. There

must have been a "manifest imbalance" where the rights of an individual are
unnecessarily trammeled by implementation of the affirmative action plan.

The

preference must be justified by a compelling governmental interest that is achieved only
via narrowly tailored means. There was no evidence of past discriminatory practices.
The threat of loss of federal funding is not considered to be a compelling interest. There
was no statistical imbalance present to support the contention that this was evidentiary of
past discrimination practices.

The African American employee was retained solely

because of an established racial criterion imposed by the Board. 118
Ledoux v District of Columbia

The case centers around the legal principles of strict scrutiny and manifest
imbalance.

The case challenges both the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

amendment and Title VII.
The facts of the case state that non-minority and male employees who were
denied promotions within the police department brought suit challenging the
department's affirmative action plan in place designed to place special emphasis on the
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Cunico v Pueblo School District No. 60, 917 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1990) at
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Cunico at 436-440.

431.
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hiring and advancement of females and minorities in areas where there was an obvious
imbalance in minority employment.

Several hundred Grade lI Detective positions

became available, however none of the appellants were ultimately selected for this
position.

Believing that their failure to obtain promotions was related to illegal

preferential treatment, they failed discrimination charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. They alleged inter alia ("among other things"), 119 that they
were denied promotions in violation of Title VII and the due process clause of the Fifth
amendment. After a bench trial, the District Court concluded that the challenged
promotions pursuant to a voluntary affirmative action plan was valid and entered in favor
of the appellees. 120
The Court determined that the voluntary affirmative action plan must be
justified as a remedial course of action and it must not unnecessarily trammel the
legitimate interests of non-minority employees. The court can sanction under both Title
VII and the Constitution, the authorization to give greater weight to a minority or female
applicant who is qualified to do the job, which is the manifest imbalance. Because the
voluntary affirmative action plan did not have an undue burden to achieve proportional
representation by freezing that representation in perpetuity, by establishing a fixed quota
system, therefore the plan is legitimate. The plans did not transgress any of the statutory
limitations on the scope of voluntary plans. It doesn't call for layoffs; it doesn't totally
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0ran's Dictionary of the Law, Daniel Oran, J.D., 1983.
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Ledoux v District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1987) at 1293.
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exclude nonminorities from promotions; and it does not establish representation m
perpetuity.
The Court of Appeals held that the appellant's did not adequately prove that the
Department's Plan was invalid under Title VII, and that the District Court did properly
dismiss the appellants' Title VII claims of reverse discrimination. The court remanded the
case in order to determine the factual basis of whether the Department had a valid claim
for believing that affirmative action was prudent and necessary to remedy the present
effects of past discrimination within the Department. The ultimate burden of proof was
placed on the appellant. They are required to demonstrate why the affirmative action
plan was considered to be in violation of their rights afforded under both the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VII. 121
Summary

Case law regarding affirmative action has generally been organized around two
types of violations: Fourteenth amendment, equal protection clause violations an Title
VII violations. The major themes associated with the challenges are: strict scrutiny and
manifest imbalance. The objective of race conscious affirmative action measures is to
remedy the current effects of past vestiges of discrimination. 122 However, the level of
proof necessary to substantiate an employer's use of race consideration in employment
practice differs depending upon whether the challenge is invoked under the auspices of
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Ledoux at 1306-07.
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U.S. Steelworkers of America v Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 199 (1979).
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either an equal protection clause or Title VII violation.

Title VII stipulations were

adopted in Johnson v Transportation Agency of Santa Clara in 1987. In regard to Title
VII, the affirmative action plan must be justified by the existence of a "manifest
imbalance" in a job category traditionally segregated by the under representation of
women and

minorities. 123 Upon demonstration of the manifest imbalance through

statistical evidence, the Court has the arduous task of considering whether the
constitutional rights of the discriminatee are :unnecessarily trammeled" by the invocation
of the affirmative action plan. 124
In contrast, analysis of an equal protection clause violation is determined using
the Strict Scrutiny Two Prong Test, which was adopted in 1989 in City of Richmond v
Croson. 125 The Fourteenth amendment equal protection clause stipulates that States are
prohibited from enforcing or creating any legislation which denies an individual's equal
protection rights as afforded by the U.S. Constitution. 126
The Court decided that judicial scrutiny is utilized in instances in which there is
clarification needed to determine whether an affirmative action plan is remedial or
motivated by unfounded notions of racial inferiority. 127 In making this determination, the
Court developed a two prong test to judge the validity of the plan. The test stipulates that
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Johnson at 1452.
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Johnson at 1452.
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Croson at 469.
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U.S. Constitution amend. XIV, § 1.
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Croson at 469.
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( 1) the racial classification used in drafting the plan must be justified by a compelling

governmental interest; and (2) the means chosen by the State must be narrowly tailored
to remedy the current effects of past vestiges of racial discrimination. 128
There must be substantial evidence to support the State's determination that
remedial measures were indeed appropriate and that other alternative measures were
explored. 129 In making this determination, evidence of gross statistical imbalances with
regard to minority or gender representation is sufficient to satisfy a Title VII prima facie
requirement. 130 However, in an equal protection clause challenge, the affirmative action
plan is required to concurrently satisfy both prongs of the Strict Scrutiny Two Prong test
in order to survive judicial scrutiny. 131 In both instances, the Supreme Court determined
that in deciding upon the issues of equal protection clause and/or Title VII violations, the
ultimate burden of proof is placed upon the parties asserting the claim, the plaintiff. 132
The next chapter, which is the fourth chapter is the concluding chapter and
discusses the findings of the study.
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Wygant at 274.
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Vogel at 599.
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Hazelwood at 299.

Haze1wood at 299.
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Wygant at 267, 277-78.

CHAPTER4
CONCLUSION

The scope of affirmative action legislation has never been clearly defined and
has always been ambiguous both in language and in appropriate design. It was initially
intended to pacify African Americans during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s,
but was enlarged in scope to include all minorities, women, handicapped, war veterans,
and the disadvantaged. Civil rights legislation and the enforcement of executive orders
specifically address discriminatory issues involving employment, education, and housing.
The purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is to prohibit employment
discrimination. Congress believed that an individual's livelihood, dignity, and self worth
were directly related to the availability of equal employment opportunities afforded to the
individual, regardless of race of gender. This Act constituted an acknowledgment that
illegal discrimination existed and required remediation. The Act does not require quota
implementation and preferential treatment for the purpose of correcting racial and/or
gender imbalances. However, the implementation of quotas and preferential treatment
are considered constitutional when they are required to remedy persistent discrimination
practices within public sector employment. The Civil Right Act of 1991 supplements the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, in that it protects nonminorities from having their constitutional
rights guaranteed under both Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
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9.9

Clause adversely impacted by the implementation of affirmative action plans.
Specifically, the act protects non-minorities m reverse discrimination actions.

It

mandates that all potentially affected parties are required to be afforded the opportunity
of participation in the consent decree process.
Affirmative action encompasses almost every facet imaginable with regard to
ensuring equal opportunity access.

It includes among other things, employment

considerations, higher education, and set aside programs. Critics have deemed that
affirmative action is "reverse discrimination" and just as prolific as discrimination
because minorities receive favorable consideration on the basis of their race, irrespective
of merit.

However, affirmative action proponents contend that affirmative action

programs serve to balance economic and educational distribution opportunities by
providing incentives and training programs to traditionally disadvantaged members of
American society. Affirmative action plans serve many purposes and are designed to
address the specific needs that the protected class members face in trying to achieve
economic parity. However, most plans address three specific questions.
The first question addressed within this study concerns the issue of when does
an employer have the right to practice affirmative action in awarding preferential
treatment in making employment considerations regarding hiring and promotions? The
answer to the question with regard to when an employer has the right to practice
affirmative action in awarding preferential treatment in hiring and promotions has never
been fully answered by the federal court system.

It is an accepted rule of thumb to

assume that an employer is required to practice affirmative action measures whenever the
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organization is a government contractor/subcontractor or whenever the court has ordered
the organization to implement an affirmative action plan due to evidence of past
discrimination practices currently impacting minorities. 1
The second question concerns the issue of whether prospective employers are
being discriminatory if they require prospective employees to take an examination, even
though there is evidence to support the fact that minorities usually score
disproportionately lower than their white colleagues? The answer to the question is that
employers are not acting in a discriminatory manner provided that the testing satisfies the
terms of the Strict Scrutiny Two Prong Standard. In Vogel v City of Cincinnati, it was
determined that a governmental entity is authorized to afford preference to qualified
minorities and women when needed to meet the interim goals of a consent decree. 2
However, the governmental agency is prohibited from hiring unnecessary personnel or
unqualified employees for available positions or to satisfy quota requirements. 3 In this
case, the requirement that an applicant for employment consideration be required to be
qualified in skill adheres to the provisional requirements of valid consent decrees. 4 There
are problems with this preferential treatment measure.

In some cases, less qualified

1

John A Gray, "Preferential Affirmative Action in Employment," Labor Law
Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, January 1992, 25-26
2

Vogel v City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir, 1994) at 597.

3

Vogel at 597.

4

United States v Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), 150-52.
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minorities are hired for positions that they are unqualified to possess, merely for the
purpose of satisfying internal quotas.
This issue has been at the forefront of controversy, especially in regard to
promotion examinations given to police and fire applicants. The issue in question is
"race norming" a applicant's score to compensate for the perceived notion that women
and minorities score disproportionately lower than non-minorities and Asians due to
intellectual inferiority. The practice is known as "race norming," which requires adding
extra points to adjust the scores of minority candidates to reflect a more favorable score.
Race norming practices were implemented in the l 980's and have reportedly subjected
hundreds of thousands of unsuspecting applicants to self imposed quota systems. This
practice was prohibited with the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Restoration Act 5
The City of Chicago's Police Department implemented a race norming practice
in 1989. This practice resulted in the department adding extra points to adjust the scores
of minority candidates sitting for the sergeant's examination. The City of Detroit used
the practice of separating the scores of African American and white promotion
candidates. The separated list was then tabulated and ranked from the highest to the
lowest The two lists were then compared according to rank order. The result of the
norming techniques precipitated an increase in the hiring and promotion of minorities.
Prior to the use of the race nonning practice, there was a disproportionate amount of non-

5

Paul Glastris, "The Thin White Line," U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 117,
No. 7, 15 August 1994, 53-54.

l02

minorities present in upper ranking positions within the police department across the
United States. 6
Even

though

race

norrnmg 1s

essentially

banned,

many

government

municipalities practice a new technique of race norming an applicant's standardized tests
scores, by practicing a method commonly known as "banding."

Banding involves

concealing differences in academic performance by grouping wide ranges of scores
together in a lump sum. 7 As a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, many police and
fire department have dismantled their race norming practices with regard to hiring and
promotions.
This problem of achieving racial and gender diversity has also proved to be
problematic for the Clinton and Bush administrations. One of the most prolific being the
imposition placed on cabinet secretaries and agency directors to utilize preselection
criteria to select qualified minority and female candidates for departmental positions. In
some instances,

appointments were made despite the availability of better qualified

applicants, who were neither minority nor female.

8

The third question concerns the issue of whether termination policies based
upon seniority are acceptable, if the predominant majority of the senior employees are
non-minority males? The answer to the question is that termination policies based upon
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Paul Glastris, "The Thin White Line," U.S. News & World Report, 53-54.
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Peter Brimelow and Leslie Spencer, "When Quotas Replace Merit, Everybody
Suffers", Forbes, Vol. 151, No. 4, 15 February 1993, 82.
8

Ruth Shalit, "Unwhite House," The New Republic, Vol. 208, No. 15, 12 April
1993, 12-14.
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seniority are acceptable, provided that the seniority system meets all of the requirements
established under Title VII.

According to the majority Supreme Court opinion in

Firefighters v Stotts, the primary issue concerned whether the District Court exceeded its
judicial authority when it issued a preliminary injunction that required white employees
to be laid off when other applicable seniority systems would have called for the layoff of
less senior African American employees.

9

The Court concluded that the City of

Memphis didn't consent to be enjoined from making layoffs, which decreased the
percentage of African American employees. The modification altered the application of
the seniority system and was held to be outside of the jurisdictional authority of the
Court. Although the consent decree in this case didn't include retroactive seniority, the
Court placed a lot of emphasis on the fact that there was no evidence that any African
American protected from layoffs had been prior victims of discrimination. Therefore,
there was no award of competitive seniority made to any of them. The Court perceived
the modification to be an infringement on the vested seniority rights of non-minority
firefighters.

These questions are just the tip of the iceberg.

There are many more

questions which include, but are not limited to answering questions relating to
discrimination allegations filed by the disabled, people alleging religiously infringement,
and others. 10

9

Louise Jackson Williams, "Last Hired, First Fired - Rights Without Remedies:
Firefighters v Stotts", Detroit College of Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 215, 1985, 230.
10

Louise Jackson Williams, "Last Hired, First Fired - Rights Without Remedies:
Firefighters v Stotts", Detroit College of Law Review, 232.
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Despite the courts efforts to encourage diversity within the workplace,
discrimination still exists. The federal court system closely scrutinizes the evidence that
an employer uses to justify the implementation of voluntary affirmative action programs.
This is done in order to determine whether the plan is necessary and the remedial
measures necessary to discourage the perpetuation of past discriminatory practices. The
Supreme Court bases most of their decisions on the holding of both Croson and Johnson.
There are four conditions that preclude a legally valid affirmative action plan
under terms of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. First, the plan must have a
remedial purpose, designed to eradicate a statistically significant imbalance in
traditionally segregated job categories; secondly, the plan must be temporary in duration,
implemented in a manner that is done to attain, but not maintain parity within the work
force; third, the plan must not impede on non-minority and male opportunities; and
fourth, the plan must not unnecessarily trammel the rights of others or necessitate the
replacement of employees currently in place.
Public sector employers must follow the guidelines set forth under Title VII, as
well as the guidelines of the Equal Protection Clause, as defined under Croson and
Johnson. The Supreme Court held in Croson that government classification based on
race are subject to strictest scrutiny and must satisfy the requirements as set forth under
the Strict Scrutiny Two Prong Standard.

The standard requires the government to

establish that there is an imbalance by comparing the racial composition and/or gender of
its work force with that of the local, qualified labor pool; that the government's own past
discriminatory practices created the imbalance; and that the plan is necessary remedial
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measure to remedy the imbalance. These requirements were established under the terms
of the Wygant decision. This decision has come to be associated with the requirement
that state and local governments are allowed to establish voluntary affirmative action
plans within their jurisdiction, provided that the plans are designed specifically to remedy
the present effects of the government's past discriminatory practices.
Under Croson legislation, state and local governments are prohibited from
imposing minority set aside requirements on their contractors/subcontractors except in
instances in which the government is attempting to remedy the present effects of past
vestiges of the government's own identifiable past discriminatory practices of contracting
to non-minority firms in the local industry. The Constitutional limits established under
Wygant and Croson establish that first, state and local governments affirmative action
plans that utilize racial classifications for employment purposes are subject to strict
scrutiny; secondly, state and local government may not itself be a voluntary affirmative
action employer, except to remedy its own identifiable past discriminatory practices;
third, affirmative action lay-offs are not allowed; and fourth, state and local government
MBE set asides are not allowed, except to remedy either government's own past
discriminatory practices or those of the local industry, and then no more than necessary
to remedy identifiable discrimination.

Even though the voluntary affirmative action

plans are judicially scrutinized, and the fact that there is an ever increasing resentment
among both minorities and nonminorities regarding the implementation and the need of
affirmative action plans, the court system continues to support the majority of the
discrimination claims presented with regard to these policies. The imposition placed on
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employers to establish goals and timetables for diversifying the workplace is one of the
only viable means available to ensure that minorities and women are afforded equal
access to opportunities that they may not have been privileged to had it not been for the
implementation of these programs.
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